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* 
Executive Summary 
This study examines the time use and incentives to retire that include both the value of paid 
and domestic work. This is accomplished by documenting the time use in unpaid household 
work in a group of EU countries. An economic value is assigned to this time, which is then 
used in calculating the income replacement rates and the option values for retirement.  
When analysing the differences in time use among the countries, the variations are 
substantial, but can be classified along the lines of the welfare-regime typology: 
1.  Central Europe, which has relatively fewer paid work hours (Germany and Belgium) and 
average domestic work hours (Germany); 
2.  Small countries (Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal) and the UK, which have more 
paid work hours and more domestic work hours for men (except for Portugal) and women; 
and  
3.  Exceptions, such as Denmark, which has relatively little domestic work or Belgium which 
has little domestic work for women contrary to expectations about the continental regime. 
The small number of countries does not allow for a deeper analysis of the southern regime 
(Portugal, Spain and Greece) or to make any definite conclusions about the Nordic regime 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway). But we can see some similarity among continental 
countries and within another group that includes the UK and the smaller countries, with the 
Nordic regime being somewhat distinct from the others.  
In retirement schemes, we separate there regions. 1) Central Europe (Germany), Finland 
and Portugal have high replacement rate and flat option value curves after the pensionable 
age. 2) Belgium and the Netherlands are similar but with greater incentives from 
retirement since pensionable age. 3) Denmark and UK have most incentive compatible 
systems, since replacement rates are low and option value is rising after the pensionable 
age. These regimes overlap to some degree with general time use patterns. It is shown that 
the inclusion of domestic work in incentive calcula-tions makes retiring more attractive, and 
that the results of the calculations correlate with actual retirement ages in Europe. 
Replacement rates are close to or greater than 100% when domestic work is ac-counted for. 
 
Second part of the study examines the effects of health status on the financial incentives to 
retire in five European countries: Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
We consider individuals who report having “a chronic physical or mental health problem, 
illness or disability” and admit being hampered by it in their daily activities at least to 
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some extent having poor health status. Health status can have greater influence on the 
behaviour of women. If women value domestic work higher than men do, they might be more 
prone to retire early for health reasons in order to be able to catch the benefit from domestic 
work while still able perform household chores. Women in poor health have also relatively 
high total work burden. The average replacement rates are shown to be higher for women in 
poor rather than in good health. The reason is either the relatively high labour supply of 
women in poor health, as in Denmark and Finland, or the high domestic work supply of non-
employed women in poor health, strikingly so in Denmark, Finland and Netherlands. The 
high dual burden while at work and domestic work opportunities may push for retirement.  
 
Women in good health exhibit continuity of life time patterns and domestic work supply does 
not increase substantially after retirement. Women in poor health are instead faced with dual 
burden of work that can explain the withdrawal from work. The first reason is the longer total 
working days leading to the scarcity of leisure. The second reason is the high supply of 
domestic work. The dual burden of work encourages retirement. This is also shown in high 
replacement rates when including in them the value of household work before and after 
retirement. This is explained either by relatively high labour supply or by high household 
work supply (compared to healthy). 
 
Health appears to have a different effect for men. It is shown that especially for healthy men 
the increase in domestic work after withdrawal from the labour market is large in relative 
terms (doubles on average), and the effect of accounting for domestic work on the financial 
incentive to retire is greater for them. This can be explained by the gender specialisation of 
work and women’s continuity of life-time patterns: Men supply more paid work while women 
specialise in domestic work already before retirement. After retirement, women’s time use 
changes by less than men’s. The marginal value of non-paid-work time can thus be higher in 
the retirement decision of men.  
 
In the small country group (Netherlands but also including the UK), health has the largest 
influence on labour supply. Men reporting bad or bad health work 20 hours less per week 
in the Netherlands and UK. Women reporting bad health work 4 to 6 hours less per week. 
In other countries the effects are minor or even opposite (for Danish women). We can 
explain country differences or differences between genders by at least four alternative 
points of view. The first possible explanation is justification hypothesis (Bound, 1991). 
Those with poor health justify low labour force participation by bad health. The disability 
pension rules can vary across countries explaining also the need for justification. The 
justification hypothesis has been also used to explain why women report more bad health 
than men. We, however, use fairly objective measure of health so that this should not play 
a crucial role. Health status had to also be estimated in other countries except for Finland. 
Poor health thus captures the time use effects of poor labour market status or being single 
that correlate with it. The second related reason can be institutions and labour market 
characteristics. The Netherlands have high share of part-time workers. Those with poor 
health have a clear alternative to lower their work burden. It is also clear that household 
work can play a greater role in The Netherlands compared to Scandinavian countries. A 
third explanation can be explained by considering health as one consumption bundle 
following Grossman’s model (1972). Health as a consumption bundle works as a clear EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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substitute for paid work. Those with poor health need to consume health more and can do 
this only by reducing paid work hours. Moreover, health as a consumption bundle can be a 
clear complement for unpaid household work, especially for women. It appears that 
household work supply is strikingly high for women in poor health both in the Netherlands 
and in United Kingdom. Finally, in Grossman’s approach health is also considered as a 
lifetime investment. Health capital corresponds to human capital so that it decays over 
time and requires continuing investment. The final point of view is then the possible 
different needs to invest in health capital and in time horizons in health capital between 
the countries. The Netherlands and United Kingdom may appear to be countries with fairly 
good health services in the event of bad health. Thus there may appear less need for 
working longer in order to provide funds for covering the likely health expenses in the 
future when being already currently in bad health. 
 
 
Policy conclusions 
 
Unpaid work and the possibilities for combining working and domestic life are very important 
in retirement decisions. Domestic work increases radically in non-employment. Non-
employed men at age 50-64 that are in good health do on average 11 hours per week more 
domestic work than older employed men. Similar difference applies for older women that are 
in bad health. One reason for this behaviour is certainly the lack of domestic work 
opportunities while at work, which has clear policy implications.  
 
The labour supply decisions of men have often been modelled taking the spouse’s current 
labour-force status to be an unchanging, external event. The study shows that domestic life 
and spouse’s behaviour are of no less importance in retirement decision of men than that of 
women. Spillovers occur not only through income effects and complementarity of leisure but 
also through substitutability/complementarity of domestic work and health consumption. 
Recent studies have found that men’s retirement decisions are most sensitive to the labour 
market decisions of their spouses (Coile, 2003, Dahl et al., 2002, Johnson and Favreault, 
2001). The increase in domestic work for men and the mild increase for women show that 
time allocation indeed becomes more similar in non-employment between genders. This can 
be explained both by complementarity of leisure and substitutability of domestic work. The 
policy implication is that economic incentives may work poorly unless the time use allocation 
decisions are properly taken into account. In this study this is indicated by the very high 
replacement rates when household work is accounted for. 
 
It is also clear that retirement policies should adapt to country characteristics: 
 
1)  Central Europe with relatively short paid work hours (Germany, Belgium) and average 
domestic work hours (Germany) do not have similar difficulties for combining work and 
domestic life. However, older German women still have strikingly low labour supply.   
 
2)  Small countries (Finland, Netherlands, Portugal) and UK have long paid work hours 
and long domestic work hours for men (except for Portugal) and long domestic work hours 
for women. It is clear that well being at work and succesful combining of working and iv | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
domestic life are very important. Health has a strong effect on labour supply, which can be 
explained by justification hypothesis, the availability of part-time work, health consumption 
or by health care that does not require an increase in labour supply to provide funds for health 
expenditures when health is expected to deteriorate in the future. 
 
3)  Domestic work supply is low in Denmark, otherwise similar to other countries in the 
Nordic regime, and in Belgium. Combining working and domestic life is easier and domestic 
work interfere less with retirement incentives. The pension system in Belgium is, however, 
fairly generous. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this work is to examine the determinants of retirement. Estimates of 
the financial incentives to retire are corrected by individuals’ valuation of domestic 
work and their health status. These estimates are accomplished by documenting the 
time used in unpaid household work in a set of European countries. An economic 
value is assigned to this time and used in the incentive calculations.  
Further, the effects of socio-cultural and demographic factors on the distribution of 
household work and its value across the countries and within households are of 
interest. The classification of countries into welfare-regime types according to their 
political, social, historical and economic characteristics offers the framework for 
comparative examination of time use in Europe and its implications as to the 
retirement behaviour of the population. 
The work is carried out at the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) and 
will constitute a part of ETLA's contribution to an international research programme, 
which the European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes is conducting 
under the leadership of the Centre for European Policy Studies. The programme is 
entitled Ageing, Health and Retirement in Europe (AGIR) and its objectives include 
documenting and analysing the health of the ageing population and the decision-
making by the aged with respect to retirement. Understanding the changes in the 
health of the population, as well as being able to link the demand for health care to 
health status and time use will facilitate the construction of scenarios of the future 
health care demand and challenges to the social security and pension systems.
1 
Exploration and documentation of time use is useful as such, since the methods of 
including unpaid work and household production into national accounting are 
constantly discussed and researched. This kind of comparative research also 
contributes to the work on the integration processes currently shaping the Europe 
Union, where the challenges of comparative research are enhanced by the increasing 
convergence in some of the more traditional variables used to identify regional 
differences and similarities in the development processes of Europe (Kosonen, 1994, 
p. 9). 
An extensive set of multinational, harmonised time-use data derived from diary 
surveys conducted in 24 countries is utilised in this work. A smaller set of countries, 
from which the original, more detailed data are available, is examined more closely. 
Table 1 presents the countries that form this latter group and the years in which the 
surveys were conducted. 
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Table 1. Countries and years of the time-use surveys 
Country Survey  year
Belgium 1999
Denmark 1987
Finland 2000
Germany 1991
The Netherlands  1995
Portugal 1999
United Kingdom  1999
 
In most countries, the life expectancy of workers is increasing. By the year 2050, 
demographic projections suggest that Europeans will live at least four to five years 
longer than in 2000 (European Commission, 2002). Increases in life expectancy raise 
the value of lifetime benefits workers receive from traditionally defined benefit social 
security plans because they collect benefits for more years. In countries with pay-as-
you-go social security systems, this trend raises the costs of providing benefits and 
may force the systems towards insolvency.  
Another important dimension is the increasing healthiness of the working age 
population (see, e.g. Costa and Steckel, 1997).
2 A priori, good health allows for the 
postponement of retirement. This is shown as an increase in labour supply (as here) or 
in increased incomes that raise option-values for retirement. On the other hand, 
healthy individuals may also have a higher demand for active leisure or may be more 
able to reallocate more of their time to productive activities such as domestic work. 
According to Piekkola and Harmoinen (Leijola) (2003), accounting for the value of 
domestic work in incentive calculations for the retirement decision reveals weaknesses 
in new pension plans, as replacement rates are close to 100%. Improving health status 
may only deteriorate the prolonging of working life prospects as non-work time 
becomes relatively more attractive. A possible policy response to the social security 
financing problems that arise in part because people are living longer could be to raise 
the retirement age. In fact, the member states of the European Community have 
committed to raising the retirement age (European Commission, 2002). 
This analysis framework considers old-age pensions and the age at which workers can 
receive ‘full’ social security benefits, technically referred to as the normal retirement 
age. Most of the systems have an early retirement age so that the legal retirement age 
can be less than 65 years old. Many people retire at the minimum age or earlier. In 
Western Europe, most workers retire before the minimum age at which social security 
retirement benefits can be received. The term ‘pensionable age’ is used here to 
distinguish explicit disability pensions from unemployment pension pipelines. Note 
that lifting the pensionable age could be done so as to raise the level of benefits 
                                                 
2 In Finland from 1980 to 2002 the share of disability-pension recipients at age 16-64 has decreased 
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received, although lifetime benefits would be reduced. The option value takes into 
account both the annual pensions and the expected length of lifetime when these 
benefits are received. Also workers who have high discount rates will place little 
value on the increase in benefits with postponed retirement and will tend to retire at 
the earliest date possible. Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) estimate that about two-
fifths of those workers in the US retiring at age 62 would not postpone their 
retirement to age 64 if that were the new pensionable age. Table 2 includes estimates 
of the average ages of withdrawal from the labour force by the OECD. These figures 
are arrived at by using a dynamic estimation model, which utilises labour-force 
participation rate data over time. The difficulty of determining the actual withdrawal 
age lies in the labour market behaviour of those below the pensionable age on the one 
hand, and in the postponement of retirement by those above the pensionable age on 
the other. The challenge is a statistical one, and mainly arises from the lack of a 
comparable standard definition for the term ‘retirement’ (OECD, 2002a, p. 7). 
Table 2. Average ages of withdrawal from the labour force in 1994-1999 
Men Women
Belgium* 59.0 58.9
Denmark 62.4 61.5
Finland 59.8 60.0
France 59.3 58.4
Germany ** 60.5 59.8
Italy 59.3 58.4
Netherlands ** 61.6 60.1
Norway 64.2 64.7
Portugal 65.3 66.5
Spain 61.1 61.1
Sweden 63.3 61.8
United Kingdom 62.0 61.2
United States 65.1 64.2
* 1971-1976
** 1993-1998  
Source: OECD. 
One of the concerns about raising the pensionable age relates to those who are unable 
to postpone retirement because of poor health. There is evidence of the declining 
prevalence of disability among all age groups (for the US, see Costa and Steckel, 
1997; Cutler, 2001). It is also evident that the percentage of jobs requiring strenuous 
physical effort has declined as well (for the US, see Manton and Stollard, 1994; Baily, 
1987). In the US a mere 5% of workers receiving benefits at the current pensionable 
age were at risk of suffering from a rise in the pensionable age owing to the 
combination of poor health, lack of pension and a physically demanding job (Panis et 
al., 2002). For an individual, however, health status may be one of the determinants of 
retirement. 4 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
2. Theoretical  background 
2.1 Time-use  theories 
Gary S. Becker first presented an economic theory of the allocation of time (1965). 
He views households as producers of non-marketable commodities, in the production 
of which the inputs are market goods, time, and the skill and education of the 
members of the household. The production function for these household goods, such 
as meals and care for family members, is constrained by the time needed to generate 
them and financial income. The outcome is an allocation of time among work, 
leisure and other activities, such that the utility of the household is maximised. 
Becker also proposes a theory on the specialisation of work by gender, in which men 
specialise in market activities while women allocate their time to household 
production based on the theory of comparative advantage (Becker, 1981).  
Becker (1965) brought the time price of consumption to economic models, but the lack 
of sufficient data has constrained the empirical testing of these models. This section 
presents Becker’s influential theory of time use, but also extends his concepts 
somewhat. Subsequently, we discuss three alternative views under debate especially in 
the analysis of time use by gender. The first view is the ‘dual burden of work’ analysed 
in greater detail for women with young children. Becker’s ‘specialisation of genders’ 
offers a somewhat contrasting view. Finally, ‘continuity of lifetime patterns’ is an 
important issue in the empirical analysis, where causality between the retirement 
decision and leisure time allocation plays a major role. If leisure time allocation remains 
the same after retirement, we can make more reliable conclusions of the effect of leisure 
preferences on willingness to retire using single cross-section data alone. 
2.1.1  Traditional theory of the allocation of time 
As noted above, in Becker’s (1965) theory, it is assumed that the decision on the 
combination of market and non-market goods to be consumed lays the framework for 
time allocation among work, leisure and the other activities. Activities other than work 
and household work (production) are considered ‘consumption’. Consumption decisions 
are constrained by the time needed in the various consumption activities as well as by 
the consumers’ income. More time allocated for work means more income but at the 
same time less time for consumption.  
The consumers’ utility is 
11 1 ( ,... ) ( ,... ) ( ,... ; ,... ) im m m m UU Z Z U f f U x x TT =≡ ≡ ,  (1) 
where households’ basic commodities  ( , ) ii i Z fxT =  directly enter the utility 
function. The utility function is maximised subject to separate constraints on the 
expenditure of market goods and time and to the production functions in equation 
(1). Let T=total time available,  c T =hours spent at consumption,  w T =hours spent at 
work,  i t =input of time per unit of  i Z  and  i b =input of market good per unit of  i Z . 
The constraints are  TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 5 
 
                                     
ii w
iw
ii i
ii i
p xI V T w
TT T
Tt Z
xb Z
==+
=−
≡
≡
∑
∑
a) goods constraint 
b) time constraint 
c) production functions  
   (2)   
and can be written in single constraint   
' ii Z S π = ∑        ( 3 )  
'
ii i i
w
pbt w
SV T w
π ≡+
≡+
    ,      (4) 
where  i π  = full price of a unit of good I,  ' S =full income,  i p =price of market good i, 
w= earnings per unit of work, V =other income and I =total income. Instead of 
valuing household work at the person’s own income, we choose the net hourly wage 
for this kind of work in each country. We are not looking for the willingness to pay 
for domestic help, which would imply the use of employer’s total expenditure, nor 
taking the opportunity-cost approach to the allocation of time. The aim is to capture 
the notion of the true value of this kind of work. Furthermore, since we are allowing 
for national variation in the pension systems, social security payments, and tax 
treatments of earnings, accounting for differences in the value of household work as 
well is logical. The same characteristics of the countries that affect the time spent in 
household work are also determinants of the net wage for domestic work. If female 
labour force participation is low on the one hand, but hiring private domestic help is 
common on the other, the value of household work is low. More specialisation of 
work by gender can be expected in this case. Conversely, where most household 
work is performed by the household members in addition to paid work, and by both 
genders, the net wage for household work is high. The allocation of work within the 
household is respectively expected to be more equal. Taking utility from domestic 
work D as separable, the utility function can be written as 
11 1 ( ,..., , ) ( ,... , ; ,..., , ) mm m dd d UU Z ZZ U x xx T T T =≡ , (5) 
where  i x  is the commodity produced and  i T  is the time used in consumption and 
households’ basic commodities  (,) ii i Z fxT =  and household commodities  (,) dd d Z fxT =  
directly enter the utility function.  
At this stage, it is important to consider distortions created by taxes on wages and 
consumption. The standard tax wedge calculations, inclusive of all taxes, and 
assuming that also share x of employer’s social security payments are paid by 
individuals in the form of lower wages, are shown in Appendix A. Let  wi i Z px ≡∑  
and  dd d Z px ≡  define a single aggregate commodity in consumption, the latter in 
respect of domestic goods. The budget constraint inclusive of taxes on capital and 
wages becomes 6 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
(1 ) (1 )
v
wk w s m k Z IV M T w M M M == − + − − −  ,   (6) 
where (1 ) ws m k Tw M M M −−−  is the value of paid work and  dd Tw is the value of 
domestic work and 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 (1 ) ) 1 (1 )
s
wx s x s
M
wx s x s
−−
==
+− +−
 the effect of employer’s   (7) 
social security lowering gross wages 
(1 (1 ) ) 1 (1 )
m
wm m
M
wx s x s
==
+− +−
the effect of wage tax  (8) 
rate 
/(1 ) (1 ) /(1 )
(1 (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) ) 1 (1 )
co
k
wk wk k mk k
M
wx s wx s x s
+ − +
===
+− +− +−
 (9) 
the effect of consumption tax rate. 
s = employer’s social security tax  
w = observed gross wages 
m  = average wage tax rate 
k  = average consumption tax rate based on pre-tax price of consumption 
and where 
v
k M  is the equivalent tax wedge for capital income. It is clear that taxes 
distort the value of paid work and capital income. Domestic goods are assumed to be 
free of tax. Domestic work can also differ from work in the black-market economy. 
Earnings from the black-market economy are often used for consumption of goods 
available in the market and consumption taxes distort the market prices.  
The time budget constraint now looks as 
ic w d TTT TT == −− ∑   .      (10) 
 
Spending more time on domestic work takes time away from that spent on paid work or 
leisure. Let  wwiw w Z px p x ≡≡ ∑  define the composite aggregate commodity in 
consumption. The allocation of time between domestic work and market work is thus 
determined from the equilibrium condition (1) 
ww d
Uw U
x pT
∂∂ =
∂∂
  .        (11) 
A number of recent studies contribute to the analysis of the quality of leisure time. Time 
scarcity and the paucity of leisure time are also at the centre of discussions about the TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 7 
 
quality of contemporary life (Robinson and Godbey, 1997). Standard working hours, 
which assumed a 40-hour week over five working days, are no longer the norm. Hurd 
(1996) suggested that in the presence of labour market rigidities the hours of work 
cannot be varied and the constraint will be to work more than it is desired and then not 
to work at all. 
Dual burden of work  wd TT +  
Becker (1981) proposes a theory of division of labour based on comparative 
advantage to explain why men ‘specialise’ in paid work and women in unpaid work. 
Becker’s notion is based on the idea of partnership and concentrates on the quantities 
of ‘total work’, while other time, including leisure, is used for maintaining the 
capital necessary in market and home work including leisure. Men have comparative 
advantages in market work (a higher wage level in l.h.s of 3) and/or hours spent in 
domestic work are more valuable for women ( / d UT ∂ ∂ higher for women). The 
marginal utility of leisure and the allocation of time to leisure can still be considered 
relatively independent of time allocated to total work. Bittman and Wajcman (1999) 
indeed argue that specialisation can be justified if the leisure time activities are more 
or less the same for each spouse. We show evidence, as they do, that total working 
hours are relatively constant, irrespective of sex. Thus women’s larger burden of 
domestic work often substitutes for paid work, and total working hours are the same 
as for men. Household work is also shared more equally between men and women in 
non-employment. Thus, specialisation of genders can explain the unequal allocation 
of homework during a lifetime and the big change experienced by men after 
retirement. Thus, our analysis is derived from the observation that the allocation of 
work within a household is determined differently across the course of a lifetime. 
According to most evidence, leisure time has become scarcer (Linder, 1970; Frederick, 
1995; Robinson and Godbey, 1997). This is especially the case for women (Bryant and 
Zick, 1996, Hochschild and Machung, 1989; Hochschild, 1997). The talk of a gender 
gap in leisure can be well taken for households with young children. It may not be as 
evident for early retired persons who only in few cases have children younger than 18 
years of age.  
Specialisation of work: Allocation of paid and household work varies  
In this approach the marginal utility of leisure and the allocation of time to leisure are 
relatively independent of time allocated to total work. As discussed above, Becker 
proposes a theory of comparative advantage to explain why men specialise in paid work 
and women in unpaid work. Becker’s notion is based on the idea of partnership and a 
concentration on the quantities of ‘total work’. One way to defend the benefits of 
specialisation in work and unpaid work is to analyse the fruits of production: the use of 
leisure time generated by joint effort in work. Bittman and Wajcman (1999) argue that 
specialisation is justifiable if the leisure time activities are more or less the same for 
each spouse. It is clear that specialisation of work patterns also has direct implications 
for retirement. Early retirement is often believed to cause an important change in the 
lifetime patterns of men. OECD (2000) is concerned about the increasing passivity 8 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
among men who retire. In Huovinen and Piekkola (2002), retired men, however, appear 
to spend more of their time in voluntary work or neighbourhood help. According to our 
results, household work is shared more equally between men and women in non-
employment, which offers yet another view on the specialisation of work. It seems that 
the allocation of work within a household is determined differently during the phases of 
a lifetime. One explanation could be that household work is more leisurely in nature 
once the individuals have retired, while during working life it is considered a burden of 
excess work on top of paid work. This would also imply that the value of household 
work could be higher in retirement since some of the non-monetary utility from paid 
work is transferred to household work after retirement. 
In specialisation of work, total hours for paid and domestic work can be considered 
relatively constant. We show evidence that total working hours are relatively constant 
irrespective of gender. Thus the larger burden of domestic work carried out by women 
often substitutes paid work and total working hours are the same as for men. One 
potential tool for analysing the changes in working hours ( w T ) and leisure time 
( wd TT T −−) are differences in the importance among commodities with respect to 
foregone earnings. These foregone earnings depend on the time and money intensity of 
the commodities. The basic rule is that the more time (money) intensive goods are 
preferred, the more leisure time (wage) one needs to consume them. The result of a 
wage rise depends on the normality of the goods and, particularly for less money-
intensive goods, it is not straightforward to find out whether the substitution effect or 
the income effect on time used for leisure is the dominating one. The smoothing of total 
hours for work between genders in the household can, in principle, loosen the time-
budget constraint, when a spouse can take a larger share of the domestic work. 
Continuity of lifetime patterns: household work and active leisure varies 
relatively little over time 
One important aspect in leisure time analysis is the possible continuity of lifetime 
patterns. An OECD report discusses the tendency for people to continue their leisure 
time-use as they have done before (OECD, 2000). This can be particularly true for 
women. According to our analyses of time use, women adjust their total work supply by 
less than men with respect to employment status. Women are also found to be less 
likely to retire early and, hence, to continue with the same daily routine as before (for 
Finnish studies, see Elovainio et al., 2001, Gould et al., 1991). If time-use patterns are 
continuous, observed leisure patterns that are the same over the lifetime can be used to 
explain the determinants for early retirement using a single cross-section data. 
Continuity of lifetime patterns also mitigates the importance of the dual burden of 
employment if women are already able to fulfil their leisure time plans during active 
participation in working life. The ‘dual burden’ of women can be interpreted as the 
ability to carry out simultaneously several tasks. Women’s work typically involves 
coordinating multiple activities, ‘sequencing and prioritising of certain times’ (Adam, 
1995, p. 95). It is possible that the time allocation of men is more one-dimensional. One 
reason for this could be the industrial organisation of labour and the specialisation of 
men in paid work before women (for a historical view of this process, see Thompson, TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 9 
 
1967; Landes, 1983). The leisure time-use is thereby more bounded by clock time, and 
less frequently involves other activities as simultaneous activities. 
2.1.2  The measure of the value of household work 
The choice of the measure of the value of household work time is not straightforward 
and also depends on which approach is appropriate for analysing time use. In 
addition, whether operating on the micro- or the macro-scale affects the choice of 
measure. A large number of exercises aiming at valuing time have dealt with 
amending national accounting to include non-market work in addition to market 
production. In these cases the measures used have tended to differ according to the 
production or welfare orientation of the system (Juster and Stafford, 1991, p. 506). 
In systems taking the former view, the valuation of non-market time has been cost-
based. The two alternative measures for the value of household work in this case are 
the cost of buying the service from the market or choosing to value the time with the 
amount of money saved by doing the job oneself. In either case, the value is 
essentially determined by the wage rate of a provider of such a household service 
added with any excess costs. 
If the aim of the accounting system is to measure welfare, rather than the production 
cost of household work, the value of the foregone alternative activity is often chosen. 
Thus for an employed person, the value of an hour spent in household work is valued at 
his or her wage rate from market work. Juster and Stafford (1991, p. 506) discuss the 
strengths and the weaknesses of these valuing methods, and point out that valuing non-
market work at the person’s own wage yield biased estimates for individuals not 
employed. Furthermore, whichever wage rate is applied, the preferences of household 
members and the leisure utility of household work are always ignored. 
This work is clearly of the welfare-oriented kind because we are considering individual 
decisions and not national accounts. Nevertheless, the choice of a person’s own wage 
rate as the value of household work is not appropriate here because of several reasons. 
First, the incomes would rise implausibly high with own wage-rate. The non-employed 
do not receive a wage, and the value of their household would remain without a 
measure. Furthermore, the alternative own-income measure for the retired (pension 
income) is not a measure of the value any foregone activity as is own wage-rate. 
Second, the net wage of a household worker in each country entails many aspects of the 
society and the market for such work, which we want to be able to account for at least 
to some extent. Third, using the net wage for household work captures some of the 
intuition that for people with lower own wage-rates the value of household work can be 
relatively higher than for high-income individuals. Further, even if household work 
services were bought from the market, the amount demanded would generally be a fixed 
number of hours per week. Thus the household work performed at the margin would 
still be done by household members themselves, and the value of the work, not the cost 
of hiring help, is the appropriate measure of the value of household work. The idea of 
specialisation allows for different marginal values of domestic and paid work because 
these are considered separate from the leisure time decisions. It is also clear that the 
degree of continuity of lifetime patterns is important. If men tend to reallocate their time 10 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
more than women after withdrawal from work, the retirement decision can be more 
sensitive to the value of domestic work, as we indeed find to be the case for men. 
2.2 Welfare  regimes 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 26–29) describes three welfare-based regimes of 
interrelations between the functional strata in the society. The classification is based 
on the historical legacy of institutionalisation, class, political stratification, and 
mobility between classes. Esping-Andersen's regimes are: 
1.  The liberal regime, where the state only guarantees a minimum level of welfare 
through assistance or subsidies, and the labour market is upheld by traditional, 
liberal, work-ethic norms. ‘Being one’s own man’ though hard work and taking 
the responsibility for one’s success or misfortune describe the attitude. The 
society of the liberal welfare regime is dualistic, with relatively high inequality in 
the economic wellbeing between the well-to-do and those who subsist on the 
minimum wage. Esping-Andersen for example classifies the United States, 
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom into the liberal welfare regime. 
2.  Conservative (or corporatist) welfare regime has its roots in the strong influence 
of social class as a determinant of social rights, and continues to harbour status 
differences with its relatively small redistributive effects. The role of religion and 
the Catholic Church in particular –in politics and as a provider of services – and 
the sense of community is strong. Partly as a result of this, the family and related 
gender norms are of great significance in shaping the labour market, for example. 
Traditionally, the participation of women in paid work is low. Among European 
countries, Esping-Andersen finds Austria, France, Germany and Italy 
representative of the conservative regime. 
3.  The Scandinavian countries represent the Social Democratic welfare system at its 
purest. The welfare regime is built on the ideal of the equality of the highest 
standards (not of minimum needs) and a high level of universalism both in 
benefits and payments characterises the Social Democratic welfare regime. 
Everyone is covered by the public welfare system regardless of his or her income 
or social status. On the other hand, the strong public effort in providing these 
services has hindered the growth of the private sector in the field of health care 
and social services, for example.  
Pekka Kosonen (1994, p. 23) discusses Esping-Andersen's classification in relation to 
methodology of comparative research and European integration, and presents his own 
categorisation of welfare regimes in Europe. A typology of welfare states into four 
schemes, based on Kosonen’s classification, is applied in this work. The 
Scandinavian, continental, southern, and British welfare regimes are compared. While 
Esping-Andersen includes British society into the liberal regime with the United 
States and Australia, Kosonen argues that the UK was one of the early welfare states 
with a broad system of social insurance and public services developed during the time 
period between the world wars. More recently, with the reorganisation of its welfare 
system, the country has taken a step towards neo-liberalism. However, the UK still 
does not, according to Kosonen, qualify as a liberal welfare state like the United TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 11 
 
States or Australia, where the liberal regime has been the norm from the early days of 
statehood. In the European context, Kosonen presents the UK as a regime of its own. 
The continental regime is close to Esping-Andersen’s conservative welfare state, but 
Kosonen differentiates the peripheral regime further. This distinction according to the 
location within the region emphasises the dynamics of the regional development and 
the political and economic integration of Europe. In this work the southern welfare 
regime corresponds to the peripheral regime by Kosonen, and Portugal represents the 
countries included in it. 
Kosonen finds clear relationships between the regimes and for example female labour 
force participation, public social expenditure and employment levels. In terms of 
social security systems and the labour market structure, the Scandinavian and British 
regimes represent universal coverage and a strong role of the public sector in the 
economy, while the opposite holds in the continental and the peripheral regimes. 
Similarly, female labour force participation is high in the first two and low in the 
latter pair of regimes. In the Scandinavian regime, the female labour force 
participation as well as the public sector employment are higher than in the British 
regime, and the peripheral regime has the lowest shares, differing thus from the 
continental regime (Kosonen, 1995, pp. 33-45). Table 3 presents the classification 
applied in this with short characterisations of the welfare regimes and examples of 
countries falling into them, as well as references to Esping-Andersen’s typology. 12 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
Table 3. Welfare regimes according to Esping-Andersen and Kosonen 
 
2.3 Time-use  regimes 
The level of economic development and the structure of the society, as well as the 
welfare regime arguably affect the time use of the population. Gershuny (2000, pp. 
33–45) presents a classification of countries into time-use regimes according to 
alternative structures of the service economy. As a background to this observed 
difference in time-use, he describes the process of development and economic growth 
in Europe from pre-industrial to post-modern economies. When time use is viewed 
against this background it appears as “not a mere indicator of social change; it is itself 
part of the essence of social change” (Gershuny, 2000, p. 19). Economic development 
has through improved technical efficiency allowed societies to allocate more of their 
time towards activities not related to satisfying basic needs. This translates into a shift 
from production and consumption of low value-added goods to production and 
consumption of high value-added goods. Table 4 outlines the socioeconomic 
development from pre-industrial through industrialising to post-industrial societies 
and its implications on time use in production and consumption, as well as differences 
in time use with respect to social status and gender.  
Scandinavian Continental Southern British
Esping-Andersen Social Democratic Liberal
Countries Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Iceland, 
Denmark
Belgium,  Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria , 
Switzerland
Greece, Portugal, 
Spain 
The United 
Kingdom
Social security 
systems
Share of public social 
expenditure of GDP 
high
Share of public social 
expenditure of GDP 
high
Share of public 
social 
expenditure of 
GDP low
Share of public 
social 
expenditure of 
GDP high
Welfare services 
universal
Welfare services 
restricted
Welfare services 
restricted
Welfare services 
universal
Structure of the 
labour market
Female labour force 
participation high
Female labour force 
participation low
Female labour 
force 
participation 
low
Female labour 
force 
participation 
high
Public sector 
employment high
Public sector 
employment low
Public sector 
employment low
Public sector 
employment 
high
Italics: countries included the study
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Table 4. A historical view on time use and economic development 
Society Time use Status Gender
Pre-Industrial long hours in
subsistence work
Small elite with leisure,
no difference for
others
Strong specialization in
i time use and
k
Industrial long hours for
the subordinate
class
Strong differentiation
in time use with
respect to social class
Strong specialization in
i time use and
k
Post-
Industrial
Decreasing work
hours, increasing
consumption
Converging work time
patterns
Decreasing specialization
in time use and
work
 
Source: Gershuny (2000), p. 32. 
With convergence in working times with respect to class and gender, the time-use 
patterns of these groups have become more similar. Keeping in mind the overall 
decrease in working hours and the shift towards high value-added production and 
consumption, we can also state that the nature of free time has changed. Differences 
between countries do exist, however, and Gershuny has applied the concept of 
welfare regimes to time use. 
The existing extremes of time-use regimes are, according to Gershuny, the liberal 
market economy and the Social Democratic system, as well as the centrally planned 
economies of Eastern Europe that have entered or completed a transition towards a 
market economy (Table 5). Examples of the current different service economies are 
the United Kingdom for the liberal and Finland for the Social Democratic economy 
(Gershuny, 2000, pp. 42–45). The implication to this work is that Gershuny mentions 
the source of domestic services work as a determinant of time-use regimes: in the 
liberal market economy, women’s unpaid work and work for low wage is the main 
source of household work. In the Social Democratic time-use regime, unpaid work by 
both genders is the source of the domestic work supply (Gershuny, 2000, p. 44). 
Table 5. Time-use regimes  
Economy
Distributive 
characteristics
Wage 
differentials
Income 
dispersion National income
Source of domestic 
work
Centrally 
planned
Relatively 
egalitarian
Small Low Low  Women's  unpaid 
work
Social 
democratic 
Relatively 
egalitarian
Large Low High Women's  and  men's 
unpaid work
Liberal market Relatively 
inegalitarian
Large High Medium Women's unpaid 
work, paid work for 
low wages
 
Source: Gershuny (2000), p. 44. 14 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
3.  Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
An important source of data is the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) database, 
the collection and maintenance of which is overseen by the Institute of Social and 
Economic Research at the University of Essex in the UK, in collaboration with 
several national statistics bureaus and other academic institutions. It includes 
harmonised time-use data from time-use surveys conducted in 24 countries, with the 
earliest studies dating back to the 1960s, and the latest ones having been done in the 
most recent years. The data have been gathered by administering time-use diary 
surveys and linking the results to background information on the respondents, and 
then combining them into a database with comparability across surveys and 
countries (Gauthier et al., 2002).  
In addition to the harmonised set of data, the MTUS team has given us access to the 
original data from six of the countries included in this study. Data from Portugal and 
Belgium are not original, but cross-tabulations by employment status, gender and 
time-use categories. The national surveys include a somewhat different set of 
questions and also the extent of the socioeconomic background information differs 
from country to country. However, for the purposes of this study the original data are 
more suitable, although more laborious to analyse owing to the different formats, 
coding, and languages used. The MTUS set only includes individuals aged 60 or 
younger, while the original sets have no age limitations. Since the decision to retire is 
of interest here, extending the sample to those approaching the official retirement age, 
65 years in most countries, is appropriate. In addition to more work, the use of 
original data also brings with it room for doubt in comparability. The quality and 
accuracy of the data differ across countries and some variables do not exist in all of 
them. Such variables were constructed ‘by hand’ and may not be entirely identical in 
design with their ‘readymade’ counterparts in other data sets. 
For the most part, the surveys have been conducted by distributing time-use diary 
forms to the respondents, in which they have been asked to keep record of their 
activities during the day in 10 or 15-minute intervals. National statistical offices, or 
corresponding organisations, have conducted the surveys. Some countries’ data have 
been collected by telephone interviews, but the structure of the forms used has been 
similar. Persons have usually kept the diary on one day during the week and on one 
weekend day. Weights to correct for the weekday are either provided with the data, or 
have been constructed based on information on the day of the week of the diary day. 
From the data sets, individuals aged between 45 and 64 are selected for the analysis, 
because they are considered the relevant group for examining the decision to retire. 
Most of them have been in the labour force and contributed to the public pension 
schemes for long enough to qualify for pension benefits once they reach the legal 
retirement age. The sample sizes vary between 573 diary days for the UK and 3,643 
dairy days in the case of Germany. The original data sets were selected so that the 
surveys would have been conducted as recently and as close to each other in time as 
possible. The survey years range from 1987 (Denmark) to 2000 (Finland). TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 15 
 
The MTUS data allows for some longitudinal analysis as well, since several countries 
have provided the MTUS with data from successive national surveys. In this work, 
however, the approach is cross-sectional, partly to facilitate the financial incentive 
calculations, and partly to reach the best possible comparability. Of course, being able 
to track the same individuals through the transition from work to retirement would 
allow capturing changes in time use due to retirement and thus provide more accurate 
incentive calculations. No longitudinal surveys support this kind of panel structure, 
however. Time used in household work has been calculated for the employed and the 
employed separately, and the differences between the two groups serve as a proxy for 
the change in time-use after retirement.  
3.2 Methods 
The valuation of household work involves two steps: first we have to account for the 
time allocated in these activities and second, an economic value has to be assigned to 
the time. In this study, household work is defined as activities that are performed 
without pay, and are related to the upkeep of the household and providing for its 
members. It includes housework such as cooking, cleaning, laundry, childcare, 
shopping, maintenance-related odd jobs and related travel. For the purposes of this 
study, the time use is additionally divided into three other main categories: work, 
leisure and basic needs. Work includes all paid work, including breaks during the 
workday and related education, leisure entails time used in social activities (visiting 
friends, conversation, eating out, etc.), along with hobbies and recreation. Basic 
needs cover the activities involving personal care, hygiene, eating and sleep. 
Travel between home and the workplace is included in working time, making the 
category representative of total working time, i.e. total work-related time away from 
other time use, and is not a measure of productive work. This approach is appropriate 
when considering individual decision-making, since the total length of a workday has 
more significance for a person and his or her family than how long each activity during 
the day takes. Other travel, with the exception of recreational travel, is considered as a 
separate time-use category, making the main time-use classes add up to five. Travel for 
purposes of recreation is considered to be recreational in nature. Travel times related to 
household duties not included in the measure of household work may distort the results 
on an individual level, but in general can be viewed as a way to correct for the possible 
lack in the regional representation of the data. Omitting the travel times may thus help 
fight the possible bias towards metropolitan areas, for example. 
Table 6 provides the values of household work applied in the valuing of household 
work in euros per hour. These were provided by the AGIR project partners in each 
country. The wage costs to the employer include the social security payments paid by 
the employer, which equal the difference between the wage costs and the gross wage. 
The difference between the gross and net wages includes the social security payments 
made by the employee and income tax. The net wage applied for Denmark was obtained 
differently, and no incentive calculations have been performed for Austria. This 
explains why these countries do not appear in the table. Figures for France are presented 
for comparison although these are not otherwise included in the study. 16 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
Table 6. Wage rates for household work (euro per hour) in each country 
Belgium France Finland Germany Netherlands Portugal UK
Wage costs 
to employer
8.96 11.12 12.84 9.63 7.43 2.12 6.31
Gross wage 7.07 8.35 9.80 8.00 7.00 1.89 6.31
Net wage 3.10 6.83 7.76 5.13 5.86 1.52 6.30  
Sources: Information has been provided by AGIR project partners. 
The economic value of an hour devoted to household work is, in the case of Finland, the 
net hourly wage of a communal household-help worker. After accounting for taxes and 
social security payments as described above, the net hourly rate of €7.76 is acquired. 
Since the public sector involvement in providing household help to the elderly or 
disabled differs a great deal from country to country, and in some countries hiring 
private help is more common, it was essential to obtain the information from sources 
who know and are better able to evaluate which wage rate best describes the valuation 
of household work in each country. Even estimates of the black-market wages of a 
domestic helper were welcomed in the initial enquiries to the partner organisations, but 
in the end all the wage rates applied are either for a household helper or minimum 
wages. 
3.3  Option value of retirement 
We present both the year-to-year accrual rate and the incentive to working this year 
relative to retiring at some future optimal rate. In many pension schemes, and also in 
Finland, the accrual rate is much higher in the final working years before the legal 
retirement age. It is thus not only relevant to consider whether to retire this or next 
year, but also to consider postponing retirement to some future year to benefit from 
the enhanced accruals. Let T= the expected age of mortality at age i, t = the current 
period,  a = the period of retirement, τ = the discount factor (set at 0.03), Y = the 
wage income,  1 (, ) ri PaY −  = the level of pension available at age i when retiring at age 
a, depending on wages, k  = the relative utility of the pension benefits to the wages 
and D = domestic work income ( ret D  when retired). The value of additional leisure is 
evaluated at some opportunity income level. The lifetime utility function  t U  at time t 
can be expressed as follows: 
1
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where  () uY  is periodic-specific utility when continuing to work and 
[ ] 1 (, ) rr e t PW u kP a Y D − ≡+  is the periodic utility after retirement. Following Stock 
and Wise (1990), an option value for an individual is the difference between the 
expected lifetime utility if the individual postpones his decisions to the optimal 
retirement age and the expected value if he retires today. The option value takes into 
account both the financial and leisure costs, the latter accruing from the TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 17 
 
postponement of retirement. Here, an import leisure cost is the foregone domestic 
work, when continuing to participate in labour market. If the individual retires 
immediately, he loses some years of income and higher pension benefits. If he retires 
later, he will lose the foregone leisure time (domestic work). The option value, 
giving the opportunity cost of retiring today, is 
** () () ( ) tt t OV a E V a V t ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦   ,        ( 1 3 )  
where  E  is the expectation operator and 
* a  is the optimal age of retirement if the 
individual decides not to retire at time t. Optimal retirement should occur at an age 
where the option value is negative,  0 t OV ≤ , for all future periods of retirement (not 
for the next year only). A higher option value creates an incentive to stay longer at 
work.  
Coile and Gruber (2000) examine peak value, which is the maximum increment to the 
actuarial present value of future retirement benefits for any possible year of retirement. 
As with the option value, the comparison is not made to the next year but to the optimal 
year of retirement in the future.  
** () () ( ) tt t PKV a E PW a PW t ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦  ,  1 γ = .      ( 1 4 )  
Peak value calculations ignore the future income stream until optimal retirement. 
Samwick (2001) argues that this future income stream explains a large share of the 
variation in option value. Omission of it in peak value does not necessarily lead an 
option value to be a superior measure. Future earnings could be included as well in an 
empirical estimation as an additional explanatory variable, which in Samwick (1998) 
does not on average receive a significant effect. Peak value is also usually scaled by the 
present value of future wages until the day of optimal retirement. 
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Coile and Gruber (2000) find that using a peak value approach the social security 
incentives turn out to have bigger influence on early retirement than what has been 
found in earlier studies. Peak value also compares the values of alternative dates for 
retirement and hence the marginal value of leisure k plays no important role. However, 
this can again be incorporated in the model by including in the analysis the present 
value of future earnings as an additional explanatory variable. Another difference is that 
workers are indifferent to the variation of income and retirement benefit over the years 
since k  is set equal to unity. The values below unity are consistent with the preference 
for smooth income flows. 18 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
3.4  Calculating the optimal retirement age 
We continue with the analysis with the simplest form of the utility function, namely 
that the utility is equal to the income itself  () uY Y D =+ and 
[ ] 11 (, ) , (, ) r ret r ret uk PaY D k PaY D −− =+ , where  ret D  is domestic work when retired. 
Without any valuation of domestic work, equal to unity would imply that there is no 
disutility of working relative to being retired. Here, increased leisure time after 
retirement is supposed to allow for more time for domestic work, thus increasing the 
utility of retirement. After this correction, k  is set equal to one since the marginal 
utility of retirement leisure is already captured by the potential increase in time for 
domestic work. Finally, we assume annual steady wage growth w at 3% (so that 
w τ −  cancels out). Letting the normalised values to be represented by non-capital 
letters (12) can be rewritten as  
1
() 1 () ( 1 ) ()
a
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−
−−
=
=+ − + ∑   ,       ( 1 6 )  
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net replacement rate. The net replacement rate expresses in each period the ratio of 
net pensions and value of unpaid labour if retired to net earnings and value of unpaid 
labour when an individual is employed. Thus, it tells in percentage terms how high a 
person's income would be if he retired, compared to his income if he continued to 
work. This receives a value of zero until the minimum entitlement age. It is 
straightforward to show the respective option values and peak values.  
In contrast to the approach used in Gruber and Wise (1999) we consider social security 
contributions while employed to affect gross wages in a way that all taxes are born by 
the individual (and not by the employer). Thus we do not have any separate assessment 
of the present value of future social security payments while at work, since it is already 
reflected on the level of wages. The wealth accrual relating to pension wealth is  
22 2
1 () () () tt pwa p w a p w a + ∆= −       ( 1 7 )  
(,) (,) (,) / xa xa txa W A Y =−   ,        ( 1 8 )  
where the latter formula, pension wealth accrual per net income, shows an implicit 
subsidy or tax on the accrual of wealth. One point of discussion is to decide on 
several basic assumptions concerning the components of net replacement rates. 
Moreover, it has to be decided whether the gross replacement rates are calculated 
only or if it would be possible to take into account the different tax treatment of 
pensioners as well as differences in social security payments. In our study net 
replacement calculations take into account all tax effects, including consumption 
taxes. Income taxes at these income levels and the social security payments by the 
employer are subtracted from the earnings to arrive at net incomes. Net pensions are 
determined by netting pension benefits of taxes and social security payments on 
pensions, and the yearly accrual of pensions is taken into account. The US Social TIME USE, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT | 19 
 
Security Administration provides information of social security systems worldwide, 
and the pension accrual figures for each country are obtained from the statistics 
service of the SSA (US SSA, 1999b). Descriptions of tax systems in the member 
counties of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development are utilised 
in accounting for tax effects on wage and pension income and are shown in 
Appendix C (OECD, 2002). 
The calculation of net replacement rates needs good data on wages and pension systems 
for all the countries included. The time inputs can be calculated from the Multinational 
Time Use Study data held by ISER. This set has comparable diary data from several 
countries. However, in the calculations, one has to rely on time-use data older than the 
income data, as time-use surveys are normally carried out only in five- or ten-years 
sequences. Net replacement rates are calculated in the following way. The net 
replacement rates for each successive year of potential working time until the official 
retirement age is calculated for those aged 55. The retirement benefits depend on the 
retirement age and the country-specific early retirement-benefit systems. Benefit level 
also depends on the length of contribution periods, the rate at which individuals earn 
pensions by contributing, and minimum and maximum levels of pensions.  
A decision has to be made whether to use a global measure of housework or the 
increase of leisure time (or both) or to allow national variations such as in wages and 
benefits. Earlier work by Gershuny (2000) suggests that for all the other main categories 
of time use other than leisure there could in fact be a global model. In other words most 
of the variation in the time allocation can be explained with other-than-country 
variables. Thus, “we might say a Dutch woman’s daily pattern of life has, arguably, 
more in common with that of a North American woman than of a Dutch man” etc. 
Bittman and Wajcman (1999), on the other hand, find quite significant differences in 
unpaid work. We decide to proceed with the analysis taking into account the national 
variation in time use of the European elderly in addition to socio-demographic 
variations. The economic value of an hour devoted to household work is, in the case of 
Finland, the net hourly wage of a communal household-help worker added with social 
security payments and benefits. 
The earnings base depends on average earnings over the reference period, which, in 
turn, is strongly influenced by the way past earnings are indexed for pension purposes, 
the general increase in real earnings over the period and the age profile of earnings. We 
simplify the analysis by assuming constant real wages over time, but evaluate 
replacement rate at three different income levels. These levels are derived from the 
statistical concept of average production worker (APW) by OECD: individuals who 
earn the APW wage are fulltime production workers in the manufacturing sector whose 
earnings represent the average for such employees in the economy defined in OECD’s 
“Tax and Benefit Position of Production Workers” (OECD, 2001). A manufacturing 
worker is used to represent a middle-income earner. A worker earning twice as much as 
the middle-income earner is defined as large-income earner and someone earning two-
thirds of this is a low-income earner. In two-person households, one of the household 
members is defined as a low-income earner and her or his wage as one-third of the 
middle-income earner’s. All figures shown here are averages of the calculation for the 20 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
three income levels. Life expectancy is set for the expected values, also corrected for 
the lower expected value for unhealthy individuals. 
4.  Time use and health status 
4.1  Health status determination 
Time-use studies include self-assessed health status variables only in Finland. For 
other countries comparable data on health is derived from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). Ahn (2002) argues that self-reported assessments of 
health status in five-category questionnaires (from very poor to very good) can be 
very unreliable when making cross-country comparisons. The replies depend heavily 
on the cultural or social environment. However, demographic factors such as 
education level and age are persistently associated with similar individual health 
status across countries. We proceed along this line and assess health status by using 
wave 6 of the ECHP from year 1999. In the ECHP, we consider individuals who 
report having “a chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability” 
(European Commission (Eurostat), 2002, p. 357), and admit being hampered by it in 
their daily activities at least to some extent (European Commission (Eurostat), 2002, 
p. 358) having poor health status.  
A logistic model using sampling weights is estimated in order to reveal the 
connection of demographic, socio-economic and time-use variables to poor health. A 
separate model is estimated for the employed and the non-employed, and men and 
women in each country, respectively, because of the relatively low number of 
observations and differences in the explanatory power of the model (in general 
greater for men). Figure 1 shows first the share of individuals with poor health that 
affects daily activities by education level and age in Finland.  
Figure 1. Share of individuals with poor health interfering daily life 
by education and age in Finland 
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15 %
20 %
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The figure reveals that health deteriorates monotonically with age especially for the less 
well-educated. For the highly educated, age turns out to be a much less significant 
factor. We include a dummy for being highly educated in the estimation as a more 
detailed, and yet comparable categorisation is not possible across countries. Individuals 
at the lowest income quartile usually have a greater chance of being in poor health. 
Table 7 presents the coefficients for Finland, for other countries they can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 7. Logistic model for poor health status for those aged 45–64 in Finland 
Men 
employed
Men Non-
employed
Women 
employed
Women Non-
employed
A g e 0 . 6 00 . 0 50 . 1 40 . 5 3
(1.48) (0.09) (0.33) (0.99)
Age2 -0.0049 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0047
(-1.29) (-0.06) (-0.33) (-0.97)
Highly educated -0.92 -0.20
(-0.76) (-0.28)
Income percentile 25-75 -0.36 0.62 0.51 -0.06
(-1.43) (1.55) (1.76) (-0.17)
Income percentile 75-90 -0.06 0.57 -0.17 -0.58
(-0.18) (1.11) (-0.45) (-1.26)
Income percentile 90-100 -0.51 1.44 0.52 -0.29
(-1.31) (2.49)* (1.33) (-0.51)
Child < 18 years -0.06 -0.55 -0.24 -0.28
(-0.21) (-0.93) (-0.67) (-0.45)
40+hrs a week -0.34 0.10
(-1.43) (0.4)
Married -0.17 -0.41 -0.57 0.01
(-0.56) (-1.04) (-1.86) (0.04)
Observations 899 358 852 413
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01  
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The model as a whole is not very significant and only a few variables are significant 
at the 5% level. In all the results, coefficients are plausible and the model has, on 
average, greater explanatory power in other countries. It reveals that in all countries, 
after controlling for various demographic factors, the probability for health problems 
does not significantly differ for men or women, as the explanatory variables are 
largely the same. The primary factor explaining poor health is age. Poor health 
increases strongly with age among non-employed men in Germany and Denmark and 
among non-employed women (except in Denmark). High incomes, long working 
hours (for those in the labour market) and marriage (including consensual union) 
usually signals better health. Employed women in Finland make an exception to this 
rule. 
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The equivalent estimation for the other five countries is shown in Appendix B. At the 
second stage, the model is applied to the time-use data sets, and poor health status is 
assigned to individuals with a probability of being in poor health that corresponds to the 
distribution of self-reported bad health in the ECHP. For example in Finland, among the 
employed, 10% of individuals have a health problem that intervenes in their daily 
activities. Thus, the highest 10% of the probabilities acquired when the model is applied 
to the time-use data yield status ‘poor health’. These results are then used to predict the 
supply of paid and domestic work of individuals with poor health. 
4.2  Time use of those aged 50 to 64 
In our analysis, general health status may affect both the labour sup-ply and the 
value of non-working time. In a cross-sectional comparison made here it is estimated 
that illness or disability lowers labour supply on average by 2 hours for men and 7 
hours for women. Moreover, the unhealthy are not able to increase domestic work 
after withdrawal from work at the same magnitude as the healthy are. This, in turn 
decreases the attractiveness of retirement to them when the value of domestic work 
is accounted for. If the health problems are not severe enough to keep the unhealthy 
from working altogether, the overall effect can be unclear. 
Table 8 presents the weekly total work hours, paid and domestic work, in our data. It 
is natural that the healthy individuals carry in almost all cases a heavier load of total 
work (exception is German men).  
   
 
Table 8. Total work by gender, employment status and health, for those aged 50-64 (hours per week). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Belgium* 42.88 23.27 41.27 37.63
Denmark 46.46 45.38 24.76 17.99 44.21 51.14 21.09 35.68
Finland 55.34 50.12 26.24 26.79 56.30 59.87 39.04 37.67
Germany 44.17 45.50 35.54 29.32 46.22 36.94 47.01 34.98
Netherlands 54.07 45.31 27.04 26.34 51.41 52.06 36.99 34.15
Portugal* 51.22 14.93 63.47 41.77
United Kingdom  62.13 44.96 32.39 24.23 58.20 50.68 35.46 27.82
Average 50.89 46.26 26.31 24.94 51.58 50.14 37.00 34.06
* No assessment of health available
Employed Non-employed Employed Non-employed
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Table 9. Women’s share of domestic work by employment status and health 
for those aged 50-64 (hours per week). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
It is seen from Table 9 that regardless of the employment status, women perform the 
majority of household duties. Belgium and United Kingdom exhibit the most equal 
allocation of time in household work, whereas the disparity is highest in Portugal. 
Household work is more equally allocated among the non-employed than the employed 
in all countries, the largest difference between the employment statuses being in the 
case of healthy Danes (employed: 0.78, non-employed: 0.62). Finland stands out with 
least variation across health and employment status. This will be touched upon again 
further when the results of incentive calculations are presented.  
Table 10 presents the hours of paid work by gender, employment status, and gender in 
the samples examined. It is seen that illness or disability lowers labour supply on 
average by 8 hours per week for men and considerably less, by 1 hour per week, for 
women. Among the employed in each country, those in bad health supply substantially 
fewer hours of work than the healthy with the some exceptions mentioned earlier 
(Denmark and women in Finland).  Those with poor health share paid work more 
equally. 
Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Belgium* 0.60 0.62
Denmark 0.58 0.65 0.47 0.73
Finland  0.63 0.56 0.61 0.58
Germany 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.55
Netherlands  0.69 0.68 0.58 0.57
Portugal* 0.81 0.74
United Kingdom  0.62 0.53 0.54 0.53
Average 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.59
* No assesment of health status available
Employed Non-employed 
 
Table 10. Paid work by gender and health status among the employed 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 11. Domestic work by gender, employment status and health 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Belgium* 35.35 29.95
Denmark 35.33 35.90 28.61 33.61
Finland  39.15 32.05 28.89 36.88
Germany 27.66 28.29 21.65 20.17
Netherlands  42.78 29.82 25.95 19.73
Portugal* 44.92 35.82
United Kingdom  48.55 28.15 35.80 31.43
Average 39.11 30.84 29.52 28.36
* No assessment of health available
Male Female
Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Belgium* 7.53 23.27 11.32 37.63
Denmark 11.13 9.48 21.31 12.33 15.60 17.53 19.16 33.18
Finland 16.19 18.08 25.04 26.35 27.41 22.99 38.70 36.97
Germany 16.50 17.21 18.33 25.90 24.57 16.77 16.77 31.20
Netherlands 11.29 15.49 26.43 25.13 25.46 32.33 36.51 33.65
Portugal* 6.30 14.93 27.65 41.77
United Kingdom  13.58 16.81 28.26 22.98 22.40 19.25 33.24 25.48
Average 11.79 15.41 22.51 22.54 22.06 21.77 31.97 32.10
* No assessment of health available
Male Female
Employed Non-employed Employed Non-employed
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It is seen from Table 11 that non-employed do more domestic work than employed. 
Non-employed healthy men devote on average 11 more hours per week in domestic 
work than employed healthy men. In women’s case, the non-employed in good health 
use 9 more hours per week in domestic work than do the employed. It is evident that 
healthy men increase their supply of household work by relatively more when non-
employed. The time use of men and women become thus more similar in retirement. 
The differences depending on employment status are also clear for those men with poor 
health. On the contrary, the total work burden is rather high for women in poor health 
and domestic work supply remains high in non-employment. The high dual burden may 
push for retirement. Men with poor health do not seem to benefit as much from the 
increased household work after retirement, since the change is 7 hours. 
It can be concluded that shifts in time use patterns are clearer for men in good health 
than for women in good health. Women in good health have greater continuity of time 
use patterns. Healthy women do not in-crease their domestic work supply much in non-
employment. On the other hand, women in bad health appear to have high dual burden 
on work. Thus women in poor health may be encouraged to retire.  
Country differences are also striking. The continental European countries seem to 
exhibit more specialization in domestic work by women, and in paid work by men. 
Scandinavian countries and the UK share all work more equally. In Denmark and 
Finland women in bad health pro-vide more paid work than healthy women, which is 
the cause for high dual burden. In Denmark, Germany and partly in UK women with 
poor health have a very high domestic work supply.  
Finally, the female shares of paid and total work are as expected based on the total and 
domestic work times, and are presented in Table 12 for the employed. Total work is 
shared fairly equally among older men and women, but as the large proportion of 
unpaid work performed by women indicated, the share of paid work done by women is 
lower. The dual burden of paid and domestic work appears true for women in bad 
health. It clear that for women younger than 50 the dual burden is also explained by 
child care. 
Table 12. Women’s share of total and paid work by health status among 
the employed, for those aged 50-64. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Belgium* 0.46 0.49
Denmark 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.53
Finland  0.42 0.54 0.50 0.54
Germany 0.44 0.42 0.51 0.45
Netherlands  0.38 0.40 0.49 0.53
Portugal* 0.44 0.55
United Kingdom  0.42 0.53 0.48 0.53
Average 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.52
Paid Work Total Work
* No assesment of health status availableAGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 27 
 
5.  Incentives to retire 
5.1 Replacement  rates 
Previous OECD work has established that retirement decisions can be strongly 
influenced by fiscal incentives (Blöndall and Scarpetta, 1998), which can be 
separated into two components. The first is the replacement rate — i.e. the pension 
received as a proportion of working income prior to retirement. The higher the 
replacement rate, the greater is the incentive to retire. The second component is the 
change in net pension wealth from working an additional year and so foregoing an 
extra year of pension and paying a further year of contributions. If as a result of 
working an extra year net pension wealth remains constant, then the system is 
neutral, but if it falls, then the system imposes an implicit tax on working. 
In what follows we show option values for retirement at age 55. So any future 
retirement age is compared with the advantage of retiring at age 55. As long as option 
value is positive it is beneficial not to retire at age 55 compared with the particular year 
of retirement. The peak value of the option value shows the maximum benefit of not 
retiring today. Crossing the point of option value with the horizontal axis, which 
indicates age, shows a point of indifference between retiring now or at that particular 
age. In almost all of the pension systems, the option value starts to recede after 
pensionable age. This implies that it is less and less optimal in each successive year to 
postpone retirement from a financial point of view. The simple reason is that an implied 
higher pension level is more than offset by the fewer years left to draw the pension. A 
more comprehensive evaluation would calculate option value for every age. However, 
the point for highest option value is always close to pensionable age.  
The slope of the option-value curve thereafter is insensitive to the evaluation point of 
year. The evaluation point affects only the amount income earned, since pension income 
is not paid before pensionable age. 
Option values are calculated as an average of option values at three levels of income: 
67% of average production worker, average production worker and 167% of average 
production worker. Moreover, incomes of women are adjusted for the lower average 
supply of work. Hence, wages for men and women are assumed to be the same and the 
lower income earnings of women are explained by lower labour supply. 
Tables 13-16 show first the replacement rates for men and women. Appendix C also 
shows country-specific tables that include the pension wealth and changes in it as a 
share of earnings (a tax/subsidy effect) for all. The calculations exclude pensions from 
second and third pillars, i.e. private voluntary pensions. These are important – 
especially in the UK. However, in the calculations for the UK a basic state pension, 
£3471 a year for men over 65 and women over 60, is included (25% of workforce is 
covered by this). 
The idea here is to show the replacement rate also before pensionable age, i.e. at an age 
when the individual is not yet entitled to a pension. The individual is assumed to have 
spent 25 years at work by age 55 so that replacement rates have not yet reached the 
upper bounds. Option values shown later only take into account pension wealth after 
pensionable age (i.e. the replacement rate is set at zero until pensionable age). However, 28 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
in most of the countries an early retirement scheme exists at age 55. This is usually at 
least as generous as an old-age pension. Replacement rates before pensionable age can, 
hence, be considered as lower bounds for replacement rates in early retirement schemes. 
For each country the first column includes the effects of the value of domestic work and 
the second column excludes it. The bottom the first column shows net earnings and the 
second column the value of domestic work for each country. Last column shows the 
unweighted average of the figures over the countries.  
 
Table 13. Replacement rates for men, extended with domestic work (total) and traditional (partial), healthy 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 104 % 75 % 78 % 48 % 85 % 41 % 90 % 40 % 70 % 52 % 89 % 44 % 97 % 79 % 60 % 23 % 84 % 51 %
56 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 86 % 42 % 92 % 44 % 76 % 62 % 90 % 44 % 99 % 82 % 60 % 23 % 86 % 54 %
57 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 87 % 44 % 94 % 47 % 77 % 64 % 90 % 45 % 101 % 84 % 61 % 24 % 87 % 55 %
58 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 88 % 45 % 96 % 51 % 79 % 66 % 90 % 45 % 104 % 87 % 61 % 25 % 88 % 56 %
59 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 88 % 46 % 98 % 54 % 81 % 69 % 91 % 45 % 106 % 89 % 61 % 25 % 89 % 58 %
60 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 89 % 48 % 100 % 58 % 82 % 71 % 91 % 46 % 108 % 92 % 62 % 26 % 90 % 59 %
61 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 91 % 50 % 102 % 61 % 84 % 74 % 91 % 46 % 111 % 95 % 62 % 26 % 91 % 61 %
62 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 92 % 52 % 104 % 65 % 86 % 77 % 91 % 46 % 113 % 97 % 63 % 27 % 92 % 62 %
63 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 94 % 55 % 112 % 78 % 88 % 80 % 92 % 46 % 115 % 100 % 63 % 27 % 94 % 65 %
64 104 % 75 % 82 % 48 % 94 % 55 % 116 % 85 % 90 % 82 % 92 % 47 % 118 % 103 % 64 % 28 % 95 % 67 %
65 104 % 75 % 90 % 58 % 94 % 55 % 119 % 91 % 92 % 86 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 95 % 68 % 102 % 76 %
66 104 % 75 % 90 % 58 % 94 % 55 % 123 % 97 % 96 % 91 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 96 % 68 % 103 % 77 %
67 104 % 75 % 90 % 58 % 94 % 55 % 126 % 103 % 99 % 96 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 96 % 69 % 104 % 79 %
68 104 % 75 % 90 % 58 % 94 % 55 % 130 % 109 % 103 % 102 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 97 % 70 % 105 % 81 %
69 104 % 75 % 90 % 58 % 94 % 55 % 133 % 116 % 107 % 108 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 97 % 70 % 106 % 83 %
70 104 % 75 % 91 % 59 % 94 % 55 % 134 % 117 % 112 % 115 % 92 % 47 % 120 % 105 % 98 % 71 % 107 % 84 %
Average  104 % 75 % 85 % 52 % 91 % 50 % 111 % 76 % 89 % 81 % 91 % 46 % 112 % 96 % 75 % 42 % 95 % 67 %
YDYDYDYDYDYDYDYD YD
Employed 8.24 1.16 15.22 4.67 8.81 6.53 8.81 6.53 18.07 4.58 12.60 3.44 4.08 0.50 22.20 4.45 12.75 3.62
Retired 3.59 6.23 6.66 8.94 3.83 10.11 3.83 10.11 9.25 5.08 6.24 8.05 3.23 1.18 5.17 9.26 5.43 6.98
* No assessment of health status available
Portugal* UK Belgium* Denmark Finland, old Average
Total includes domestic work.Y=Net wages D=Net pensions in thousand euros
Finland, new Germany Netherlands
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Table 14. Replacement rates for men, extended with domestic work (total) and traditional (partial), unhealthy 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 65 % 48 % 84 % 41 % 89 % 40 % 78 % 52 % 80 % 44 % 50 % 23 % 74 % 41 %
56 65 % 48 % 85 % 42 % 91 % 44 % 85 % 62 % 80 % 44 % 50 % 23 % 76 % 44 %
57 65 % 48 % 86 % 44 % 93 % 47 % 86 % 64 % 80 % 45 % 50 % 24 % 77 % 45 %
58 65 % 48 % 87 % 45 % 95 % 51 % 88 % 66 % 81 % 45 % 51 % 25 % 78 % 46 %
59 65 % 48 % 88 % 46 % 97 % 54 % 90 % 69 % 81 % 45 % 51 % 25 % 79 % 48 %
60 65 % 48 % 88 % 48 % 99 % 58 % 92 % 71 % 81 % 46 % 52 % 26 % 79 % 49 %
61 65 % 48 % 90 % 50 % 101 % 61 % 93 % 74 % 81 % 46 % 52 % 26 % 80 % 51 %
62 65 % 48 % 91 % 52 % 103 % 65 % 95 % 77 % 82 % 46 % 53 % 27 % 81 % 52 %
63 65 % 48 % 93 % 55 % 110 % 78 % 97 % 80 % 82 % 46 % 53 % 27 % 83 % 56 %
64 65 % 48 % 93 % 55 % 113 % 85 % 100 % 82 % 82 % 47 % 54 % 28 % 84 % 57 %
65 73 % 58 % 93 % 55 % 117 % 91 % 102 % 86 % 82 % 47 % 83 % 68 % 92 % 67 %
66 73 % 58 % 93 % 55 % 120 % 97 % 106 % 91 % 82 % 47 % 84 % 68 % 93 % 69 %
67 73 % 58 % 93 % 55 % 124 % 103 % 109 % 96 % 82 % 47 % 84 % 69 % 94 % 71 %
68 73 % 58 % 93 % 55 % 127 % 109 % 114 % 102 % 82 % 47 % 85 % 70 % 96 % 73 %
69 73 % 58 % 93 % 55 % 130 % 116 % 118 % 108 % 82 % 47 % 85 % 70 % 97 % 76 %
70 74 % 59 % 93 % 55 % 131 % 117 % 123 % 115 % 82 % 47 % 86 % 71 % 98 % 77 %
Average  68 % 52 % 90 % 50 % 109 % 76 % 98 % 81 % 82 % 46 % 64 % 42 % 85 % 58 %
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 15.22 3.98 8.81 7.29 8.81 7.29 18.07 3.84 12.60 4.72 22.20 5.51 14.28 5.44
Retired 6.66 5.17 3.83 10.63 3.83 10.63 9.25 5.78 6.24 7.66 5.17 7.53 5.89 7.90
Total includes domestic work.Y=Net wages D=Net pensions in thousand euros
Average UK Denmark Finland, old Finland, new Germany Netherlands
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Table 15. Replacement rates for women, extended with domestic work (total) and traditional (partial), healthy 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 97 % 39 % 100 % 36 % 60 % 55 % 90 % 39 % 103 % 77 % 62 % 21 % 90 % 53 %
56 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 97 % 40 % 102 % 39 % 66 % 65 % 90 % 39 % 104 % 80 % 63 % 22 % 91 % 55 %
57 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 98 % 42 % 103 % 42 % 67 % 67 % 90 % 39 % 106 % 83 % 63 % 22 % 92 % 57 %
58 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 98 % 43 % 104 % 46 % 68 % 70 % 90 % 39 % 108 % 85 % 63 % 23 % 93 % 58 %
59 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 99 % 44 % 105 % 49 % 70 % 72 % 90 % 39 % 110 % 88 % 64 % 23 % 93 % 59 %
60 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 99 % 46 % 107 % 52 % 71 % 75 % 90 % 39 % 112 % 90 % 64 % 24 % 94 % 60 %
61 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 100 % 48 % 108 % 55 % 73 % 78 % 90 % 39 % 114 % 93 % 95 % 63 % 99 % 67 %
62 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 101 % 50 % 109 % 58 % 75 % 81 % 90 % 39 % 115 % 95 % 96 % 64 % 100 % 69 %
63 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 102 % 52 % 114 % 71 % 76 % 84 % 90 % 39 % 117 % 98 % 96 % 64 % 101 % 71 %
64 137 % 86 % 78 % 56 % 102 % 52 % 116 % 76 % 78 % 87 % 90 % 39 % 119 % 101 % 96 % 65 % 102 % 73 %
65 137 % 86 % 86 % 68 % 102 % 52 % 118 % 82 % 80 % 90 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 97 % 73 % 104 % 77 %
66 137 % 86 % 86 % 68 % 102 % 52 % 121 % 87 % 83 % 96 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 97 % 74 % 105 % 79 %
67 137 % 86 % 86 % 69 % 102 % 52 % 123 % 93 % 86 % 101 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 97 % 74 % 106 % 81 %
68 137 % 86 % 86 % 69 % 102 % 52 % 125 % 99 % 90 % 108 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 98 % 75 % 107 % 83 %
69 137 % 86 % 86 % 69 % 102 % 52 % 127 % 104 % 94 % 114 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 98 % 75 % 108 % 84 %
70 137 % 86 % 64 % 54 % 102 % 52 % 128 % 106 % 97 % 121 % 90 % 39 % 121 % 103 % 98 % 76 % 105 % 84 %
Average 137 % 86 % 80 % 60 % 101 % 48 % 113 % 68 % 77 % 85 % 90 % 39 % 115 % 94 % 84 % 52 % 99 % 69 %
YDYDYDYDYDYDYDYD YD
Employed 6.63 1.75 13.05 6.55 8.74 11.06 7.21 11.06 11.86 8.14 8.39 7.76 3.22 2.18 16.61 7.34 9.57 6.40
Retired 5.47 5.81 6.70 8.04 3.39 15.62 3.56 10.11 6.46 5.56 2.99 11.12 3.23 1.18 3.52 10.89 4.56 7.53
* No assessment of health status available
UK Belgium* Denmark Finland, new Portugal* Germany Finland, old Average Netherlands
Total includes domestic work.Y=Net wages D=Net pensions in thousand euros
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Table 16. Replacement rates for women, extended with domestic work (total) and traditional (partial), wnhealthy 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 97 % 50 % 95 % 42 % 101 % 42 % 95 % 56 % 73 % 37 % 50 % 25 % 85 % 42 %
56 97 % 50 % 96 % 43 % 103 % 46 % 102 % 66 % 74 % 38 % 51 % 25 % 87 % 45 %
57 97 % 50 % 97 % 45 % 105 % 49 % 103 % 69 % 74 % 38 % 51 % 26 % 88 % 46 %
58 97 % 50 % 98 % 46 % 107 % 53 % 105 % 72 % 74 % 38 % 52 % 27 % 89 % 48 %
59 97 % 50 % 98 % 47 % 109 % 57 % 107 % 74 % 74 % 38 % 52 % 27 % 90 % 49 %
60 97 % 50 % 99 % 49 % 111 % 60 % 109 % 77 % 74 % 38 % 53 % 28 % 90 % 50 %
61 97 % 50 % 100 % 51 % 113 % 64 % 111 % 80 % 74 % 38 % 79 % 56 % 96 % 57 %
62 97 % 50 % 102 % 53 % 115 % 68 % 113 % 83 % 74 % 38 % 79 % 57 % 97 % 58 %
63 97 % 50 % 103 % 56 % 122 % 82 % 115 % 86 % 74 % 38 % 80 % 57 % 98 % 62 %
64 97 % 50 % 103 % 56 % 125 % 89 % 117 % 89 % 74 % 38 % 80 % 58 % 99 % 63 %
65 104 % 61 % 103 % 56 % 128 % 95 % 120 % 92 % 74 % 38 % 81 % 67 % 102 % 68 %
66 104 % 61 % 103 % 56 % 132 % 102 % 123 % 98 % 74 % 38 % 81 % 67 % 103 % 70 %
67 105 % 62 % 103 % 56 % 135 % 108 % 128 % 104 % 74 % 38 % 82 % 68 % 104 % 73 %
68 105 % 62 % 103 % 56 % 138 % 115 % 132 % 110 % 74 % 38 % 82 % 69 % 106 % 75 %
69 105 % 62 % 103 % 56 % 142 % 121 % 136 % 117 % 74 % 38 % 83 % 69 % 107 % 77 %
70 78 % 48 % 103 % 56 % 143 % 123 % 141 % 124 % 74 % 38 % 83 % 70 % 104 % 76 %
Average 98 % 53 % 101 % 51 % 121 % 80 % 116 % 87 % 74 % 38 % 70 % 50 % 97 % 60 %
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 14.56 7.36 12.15 9.28 9.47 9.28 11.03 4.47 8.66 9.85 23.17 6.31 13.17 7.76
Retired 6.67 13.93 5.29 14.92 3.56 10.63 6.16 8.32 2.99 10.25 5.97 8.35 5.11 11.07
UK Denmark
Total includes domestic work.Y=Net wages D=Net pensions in thousand euros
Germany Finland, old Average Netherlands Finland, new
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5.1.1  Individuals in good health 
The bottom figures in the last column of Tables 13 and 15 show that the value of 
domestic work is on average one-third of net earnings for men and two-thirds of net 
earnings for women while at work. However, in the replacement rate calculations and 
especially in option values the difference in levels (20% higher value of domestic work 
for women than for men) is not that important compared with the changes in domestic 
work before and after withdrawal from work. Table 16 shows that for men the value of 
domestic work almost doubles after retirement. Men tend to change their non-work time 
allocation towards domestic work more than women after retirement. Men also start 
with ten hours less weekly domestic work while still working. 
The average replacement rate over 55-70 years is 40% higher for men and 45% higher 
for women when taking into account the value of domestic work. Hence, replacement 
rates are much higher with the inclusion of domestic work. Domestic work increases 
the replacement rate, since in all countries, irrespective of gender, there is some addition 
to domestic work after withdrawal from work. The replacement rate is on average close 
to 100% when domestic work is accounted for. 
Replacement rates on average increase relatively more for women after the inclusion of 
domestic work. The average replacement rate in ages from 55 to 70 is 99% as compared 
with 69% when domestic work excluded (Table 13, last column). For men the 
replacement rate increases from 67% to 95% (Table 15, last column). After retirement 
the relative value of domestic work exceeds annual pension income for both genders. 
Hence, it is obvious that incentives to retire are on average very high, since no net 
economic gain is achieved when continuing to work. It should also be remembered 
that before pensionable age early retirement schemes are usually even more generous 
than what the old-age pension scheme would imply. 
The average replacement rate with the exclusion of domestic work is 67-69%. It is 
evident that average replacement rates are slightly lower for men than for women with 
the exclusion of domestic work (the difference is small). Replacement rates, hence, tend 
to somewhat decrease with the higher income levels. It should be recalled that the 
income of women is corrected for the average 25% fewer working hours. 
Despite the consequent higher replacement rate for women, the option value 
calculations in the next section reveal that the valuation of domestic work makes it more 
attractive for men to retire. The relatively greater increase in domestic work after 
withdrawal from work explains this.  
5.1.2  Individuals in poor health 
Here, it is worth considering full replacement rates. For men, the average of 
replacement rates across the countries is 85% for the unhealthy instead of 90% for 
healthy. The replacement rates are higher for men in good health than in poor health in 
all countries except for Germany. By contrast, for women, individuals with poor health 
have a higher replacement rate (97%) than the healthy (89%) (excluding the old system 
in Finland). As discussed, the reason is either the relatively high labour supply of 34 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
women in poor health, as in Denmark and Finland, or the high domestic work supply of 
non-employed women in poor health in all countries (strikingly so in Denmark, Finland 
and the Netherlands). Correspondingly, the highest replacement rates for women in 
poor health are found for Denmark, Finland and Germany. 
5.2  Option values for retirement 
Consider next the path of option values with and without domestic work for each 
country separately. The figures are closely similar to those for healthy persons. 
Domestic work has two effects on option value. To begin with, the replacement rate 
is higher as shown above. This explains why pension wealth is higher when domestic 
work is included. Second, domestic work also affects the relative value of continuing 
to work because of foregone domestic work. This explains why the accumulation of 
total income is lower before the pensionable age. One can think of this as an 
additional payment to a housekeeper to maintain the required level of services. In 
addition, the health status affects time use on household work and thus has an effect 
on the incentive to retire. It is expected that the unhealthy supply less household 
work than the healthy and that they increase their supply by less after withdrawal 
from the labour market. Thus the option values are expected to be higher for 
unhealthy persons because both the replacement rate and the value of foregone 
domestic work are lower for them. Figures 1 through 12 present graphically the 
option values for healthy and unhealthy persons, except for Belgium and Portugal, 
where information on health status are not available and the incentive calculations 
are performed for the whole sample. The option values are presented in thousands of 
euros, total referring to option values inclusive of household work and partial to 
option values only considering paid work. 
Tables 17 and 18 present the yearly earnings and the value of domestic work while 
employed and in retirement. These figures, together with the replacement rates and 
option values allow a more detailed comparison of retirement incentives in different 
pension systems. 
Table 17. Yearly earnings and the value of domestic work by employments status and 
health, men 
Earnings and value of domestic work, men
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 15.22 4.67 15.22 3.98 8.65 6.53 8.65 7.29 18.07 4.58 18.07 3.84
Retired 6.66 8.94 6.66 5.17 3.56 10.11 3.56 10.63 9.25 5.08 9.25 5.78
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 12.60 3.44 12.60 4.72 22.20 4.45 22.20 5.51 17.53 4.07 17.53 4.86
Retired 6.24 8.05 6.24 7.66 5.17 9.26 5.17 7.53 6.41 7.94 6.41 7.23
Y=Wages (employed) or pensions (retired), D=Value of domestic work, thousands €
Denmark Finland Germany
Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor 
Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor 
Netherlands UK Average
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Table 18. Yearly earnings and the value of domestic work by employments status and 
health, women 
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 13.05 6.55 14.56 7.36 7.21 11.06 9.47 9.28 11.86 8.14 11.03 5.19
Retired 6.70 8.04 6.67 13.93 3.56 15.62 4.08 14.92 6.46 5.56 6.16 8.32
YDYDYDYDYDYD
Employed 8.39 7.76 8.66 9.85 16.61 7.34 23.17 6.31 12.37 7.67 14.94 7.50
Retired 2.99 11.12 2.99 10.25 3.52 10.89 5.97 8.35 3.90 9.92 4.82 9.10
Y=Wages (employed) or pensions (retired), D=Value of domestic work, thousands €
Denmark Finland Germany
Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor 
Netherlands UK Average
Good Poor Good Poor Good Poor 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2 shows the option values in good and poor health in thousands of euros in each 
country. 
Figure 2 shows that healthy men are inclined to retire earlier in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the UK as the time-use allocation implies. In Finland, the domestic 
work of men is relatively the same irrespective of health status. The lower labour 
supply for men in poor health does not alter the replacement rate by enough to have 
a large effect. In Germany, the higher supply of domestic work of men with poor 
health explains the greater incentive for those with poor health to retire.  
Figure 2 reveals that women in poor health are inclined to retire early in Denmark 
and to some extent in Germany, as implied by the relatively high replacement rates 
in all countries. In Finland and the Netherlands the curves for unhealthy women are 
above the ones for healthy women despite the very high supply of household work 
when non-employed. In Finland the explanation is that the labour supply of women 
with poor health is the highest. Since the new Finnish pension system considered 
here offers very high incentives for the postponement of retirement (an accrual rate 
of 4.5 beyond age 63 and a deduction of accrual by 7 if retiring before 62) the high-
income women with poor wealth are encouraged to continue to work later. As clearly 
remarked before, the labour supply prediction for Finland seems to be a bit distorted 
and women with poor health actually supply less paid work. Hence, this conclusion 
is not very decisive but rather shows the sensitivity of the fiscal incentive to the level 
of income. In the Netherlands, the labour supply of women in poor health is, in 
contrast, exceptionally low. Thus women with poor health are more likely to receive 
the lower, flat pension and not 70% of the wage level before retirement as when the 
income level is high enough. The replacement rate is low and therefore also the 
pension wealth accruals are low. 
One of the major conclusions made earlier is that the level of the replacement rate is 
important. Yet the level of option values did not predict the average age of retirement 
well, although the implied optimal retirement age is an important predictor of 
retirement. This leads us to believe that the retirement incentives are still stronger for 36 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
women in poor health if the replacement rate is higher, even if option values do not 
indicate this. 
Figure 2. Option values in thousands euros by health status 
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5.3 Country-specific  analysis 
Belgium. The eligibility requirements for early retirement social-security benefits were 
raised in 1997 from a minimum contributory career of 20 years up to 35 years in 2005 
(European Commission, 2002). The age at which private sector workers can receive an 
occupational pension was raised to 60 in 2002; previously it had been in the 50s (Reid, 
2002). 
The additional domestic work after withdrawal from work is estimated to be worth 
€1,500 a year for men and €3,200 a year for women. Exclusion of domestic work yields 
replacement rates comparable to those shown in Gruber and Wise (1999) (see 
Appendix). It is noteworthy that the somewhat lower replacement rates here are 
explained by the social security payments of employers that are assumed to lower the 
gross wage and, hence, pension income. In their estimate as in OECD calculations, the 
social security payments of employers are perceived to have no impact on the formation 
of gross wages. 
Figure 3. Option values at 55 years of age, Belgium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident that incentives to accumulate pension wealth are low and optimal 
retirement age (the intersection point to the zero line) is achieved at age 60 for women 
and age 62 for men. Individuals are, hence, indifferent between retiring at age 55 or at 
this age. Both the low accumulation of wealth and low optimal retirement can explain 
the average age of withdrawal from the labour force of 59 years. Replacement rates are 
95% for men and 125% for women (Tables 16 and 17). These are almost two-times 
higher than with no household income. Incentives to retire are strong after the 
pensionable age of 60. The omission of the value of domestic work postpones the 
optimal path for retirement by around two years (Figure 3). 38 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
Denmark. In Denmark, the universal flat-rate old-age pension benefit, which is financed 
from general tax revenues, is available at age 65. The minimum age for receipt of tax-
favoured pension benefits is age 67, but other programmes facilitate early retirement. A 
private pension scheme gradually overtakes the flat public pension system described 
above. Currently, roughly one half of workers are in the new system. In both old and 
new systems pensions independent of the income levels appears to have helped 
Denmark with the expected demographic transition in the coming years. 
The pre-early retirement plan, which provided a transitional benefit for people aged 50-
59 who had become unemployed and had contributed to the unemployment benefit 
programme for at least 30 years, was closed to new entrants in 1996 and will be fully 
phased out by 2006 (as assumed here, see European Commission, 2002). Legislated in 
1992, but starting in 2018, the pensionable age for women, which is age 56.6, will be 
increased to that of men, which is age 61.5. The change will occur stepwise until it is 
completed in 2034. In our calculations pensionable age is set at 61 years for both sexes. 
In Denmark, the change in domestic work after retirement is average, worth around 
€4,300 for healthy men and €1,500 for healthy women. Among the unhealthy, the 
increase is €1,700 for men and a very high €6,600 for women. Thus the unhealthy non-
employed women supply the most household work in Denmark, and it is not surprising 
that health status has the opposite effect on the added income from domestic work for 
men and women. The unhealthy also, surprisingly, supply more paid work than the 
healthy. This explains the difference in the option-value curves for the healthy and the 
unhealthy (Figures 4 and 5).  
Figure 4. Option values at 55 years of age, Denmark, healthy 
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Figure 5. Option values at 55 years of age, Denmark, unhealthy 
 
In Denmark, the unhealthy supply more paid work than the healthy. The non-employed 
perform more household work than the employed, women more than men. Among men, 
the healthy seem to increase their supply of household work by more than the 
unhealthy, while the opposite is true for women. In fact, the unhealthy non-employed 
women supply the most household work in Denmark. This explains the difference in the 
option-value curves for the healthy and the unhealthy: while the incentive to keep 
working is the lowest for men among the healthy, women take this place when the 
unhealthy are considered. 
The average retirement age is 62.4 years for men and 61.5 years for women. This later 
average age of retirement than in other countries can be explained by the public pension 
system, which encourages postponement of withdrawal from work. The replacement 
rates are lower than in other countries before the legal age of retirement of 65 years 
(63% for men and 77% for women). It is clearly more optimal to retire at the age of 68 
than at the age of 61 despite the shorter than average life expectancy in Denmark. Thus 
in economic terms optimal retirement age is beyond 68 years. The system also includes 
possibilities for additional pension income if retirement is postponed until 68 years of 
age. In fact, calculations presume the possibility to work indefinitely and thereby it 
becomes optimal never to retire. The incentives to keep working are the lowest for men 
among the healthy and for women among the unhealthy. For women, their poor health 
status might also serve as a triggering factor in the retirement decision. They may 
decide to stop working in order to be able increase their household work. This is shown 
to be the case in continental Europe, too. 
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Finland. A new system has been launched to gradually start affecting pensions in 2005. 
Pension accrual starts at age 18 and is based on the whole working career and not on the 
ten last years of each employment relationship. Accrual is 1.5 before 53, 1.9 at ages 53-
62 and 4.5 at ages 63-68. The new system is partly financed by an increase in the social 
security payments of employees, by 30% from age 54 onwards. The unemployment 
pipeline at age 60 enables still-effective retirement at 60 years. Here, the pensionable 
age is set at 62 years. The new system also allows the pension level to be corrected for 
changes in life expectancies, which are not taken into account here.  
It is noteworthy that domestic work has an important effect of lowering option values 
and especially so for men. The increase of domestic work after withdrawal from work is 
by 10 hours for men and 13 hours for women but from relatively a low starting level for 
men.  
In Finland, the marginal value of domestic work is also one of the highest as the hourly 
net wage is €7.8. In Finland, the difference between net-earned income and pension 
income is around €5,000 after retirement. This is almost totally compensated by an 
equal increase in the value of domestic work. Thus, it is not surprising that the curves 
for optimal retirement differ widely depending on the value of domestic work. The 
value of extra domestic work after retirement is €3,600 (€3,300) for men and €4,600 
(€5,600) among the healthy (unhealthy) (Figures 6 and 7). 
Figure 6. Option values at 55 years of age, Finland, healthy 
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Figure 7. Option values at 55 years of age, Finland, unhealthy 
 
The retirement incentives are weaker for unhealthy women because they supply less 
household work in absolute terms and do more paid work while in working life. It is 
optimal for men to postpone retirement to 68 years of age compared with retiring at age 
55. This would also be true with the inclusion of the unemployment pension pipeline 
although incentives would be higher for early retirement. The incentives based on a 
high accrual rate of 7.5% from ages 62 to 63 and 4.5% per year from ages 63 to 68 keep 
the curve for the option value relatively flat. Thus, individuals are rather indifferent as 
to whether to retire at age 62 or at age 68 and this is especially so for women. 
It seems that the new pension scheme is relatively successful in mitigating the decrease 
in pension wealth after pensionable age. On the other hand, the pension wealth at age 62 
years is approximately €13,000 higher for men and €14,800 for women in the new 
system to take place in 2005 compared with the current one, as replacement rates are 5 
percentage points higher (including domestic work). It is by no means clear that 
individuals are planning to retire later since the initial level of pension wealth also tends 
to be higher. Piekkola and Harmoinen (2003) show that the level of replacement 
rate/pension wealth as such is a very important determinant of retirement. 
The OECD (2003) country report has also evaluated the Finnish pension reforms, which 
lead both to higher replacement rates and to less negative pension-wealth accrual at age 
62. The study suggests that for a worker in his or her early 60s the implied less rapid 
decrease in pension wealth accrual from continuing to work for an additional year will 
be among the most favourable of the 15 OECD countries considered. The study, 
however, stresses the importance of studying alternative routes retirement. OECD 
considers the net effects on the incentives to retire difficult to judge. 
One important issue is indeed whether the employee can use the option for 
unemployment benefits at age 60. It is well recorded, as in Gruber and Wise (1999) for 
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example, that the abolition of other early retirement schemes have resulted into an 
enhanced use of unemployment (pension) pipelines in other countries. The OECD study 
assumes that in the new Finnish system individuals cannot withdraw from the 
workforce before the age of 62. However, in the new system it is agreed that 
unemployed persons from age 60 are also entitled to pension accrual at the high rate 1.9 
until the shift to old-age pension at age 62 (before that one can draw unemployment 
benefits for 500 days). This route remains an attractive alternative both for employers 
and employees. Social security wealth is for the average man €17,000 higher at age 60 
in the new system with an option for unemployment benefits than in the old system. The 
actual social security wealth can even be higher because in the new system pensions 
start to accumulate at the age of 18 instead of 23 and additional periods of non-
employment, such as those devoted to education or care of children accumulate pension 
levels. 
It should be noted that in Finland early retirement is very common, also as an aftermath 
of the deep recession in 1992-94 that pushed a large share of the older workers out of 
work. This explains why the average age of retirement is one of the lowest and close to 
60 years both for men and women. The figures drawn for the case, where 
unemployment benefits are taken into account, retains the incentives effectively to the 
same degree. 
The time-use patterns and their effects on the option values are similar to those in 
Denmark. For unhealthy women, however, the retirement incentives are weaker than for 
their healthy counterparts because they supply less household work in absolute terms, 
although the increase after retirement is larger for them. In addition to the possible 
interpretations presented in the Danish case, it is also possible that those with poor 
health are not able to allocate the extra time towards other activities but are confined to 
the house and thus spend more time on household work. 
Germany. In Germany, workers could retire at age 60, 63 or 65, depending on meeting 
certain qualifying conditions.
3 Legislation passed in 1989 and effective in 1992 
stipulated an increase of the pensionable age from 60 for women and from 63 for men to 
65 for both, starting in 2001. Pensionable age is taken as age 63 for both sexes. Old-age 
pension benefits depend on three factors: earnings points, pension factors and pension 
value. Earnings points are annual earnings divided by the average earnings of all 
contributors. Pension factor is one but includes an added factor for postponed retirement 
after 65. Pension value is the monthly benefit amount for one year’s average covered 
earnings. 
In Germany, as in other countries, workers lose approximately half of their net 
incomes from earnings after retirement. Household work does not substantially 
increase after retirement, only by a worth of €500 (€1,900) for healthy (unhealthy) 
men and €2,600 (€3,100) for healthy (unhealthy) women (the evaluation uses the 
time-use survey from 1991). This explains the closeness of the option values with or 
without domestic work (Figures 8 and 9). The replacement rate of pensions in 2000 
at age 62 is (by authorities) calculated to be 70.8% with an average annual pension 
                                                 
3 See www.bfa.de for a general description of the pension system AGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 43 
 
of €17,457 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany; Federal Ministry of Labour). In 
our calculations, the average replacement rate is somewhat higher: 77%-79% at age 
62 or around 10 percentage points higher including domestic work. It is evident that 
without taking into account the unemployment pension pipeline, the German system 
can encourage the postponement of retirement until 65 years of age or beyond for 
women. The major factor is encouraging people to work until the age of 63, as 
individuals cannot draw any pension income earlier, thus 63 is also the pensionable 
age assumed here. As an economic incentive, retirement can occur at any time 
between 62 or 67 years for men, and is postponed for women who gain least from 
additional household income. The reason for the postponement of retirement is the 
deduction of pensions by 3.6% per year if retirement occurs before 65 and an 
addition is made to pensions at 6% per year if retirement is postponed. 
Figure 8. Option values at 55 years of age, Germany, healthy 
0
50
100
150
200
250
57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Age
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
€
Option Value Men, Total Option Value Men, Partial
Option Value Women, Total Option Value Women, Partial
0
50
100
150
200
250
57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Age
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
€
Option Value Men, Total Option Value Men, Partial
Option Value Women, Total Option Value Women, Partial44 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
Figure 9. Option values at 55 years of age, Germany, unhealthy 
The Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the basic social security old age pension is 
available at age 65. However, the early retirement VUT programme was developed in 
the early 1980s as a way to allow earlier retirement. With at least 10 years of 
uninterrupted employment, a worker at age 60 could retire with a very high replacement 
rate. The government plans to gradually phase out the present system. In our 
calculations it is assumed that the pensionable age is 60. At middle incomes and above 
the replacement rate is set at 70%. For the low incomes of 67% of that of an average 
production worker it is assumed that the public flat pension rate is more favourable.  
In the Netherlands, the value for additional household work after retirement among the 
healthy is €4,600 for men and €3,400 for women. For the unhealthy, the increase in 
domestic work is small, yielding extra pension income worth only €2,900 for men and 
€400 for women. The public pension system with a flat pension implies a low 
replacement rate of around 90% (46% for men and 39% for women when domestic 
work is excluded). For the unhealthy, the total replacement rates are lower. It is clear 
that incentives to retire are relatively low for low-income earners, especially for women 
who are assumed to draw pensions from the public system rather than choosing 70% of 
incomes also at average incomes. Optimal retirement age is close to the pensionable 
age. It is seen that the age limit of 60 years inhibits earlier retirement, albeit the 
disability pension scheme is often available at earlier age. 
The total option value reaches zero for healthy men at age 64, while in the case of 
unhealthy men it is pushed up to 66.5 years. The peak occurs at 59 for both. 
Otherwise, health has little effect on the retirement incentives of the Dutch, and their 
time-use patterns with respect to health and labour force status are fairly consistent 
with the hypotheses of the healthy performing more work, both paid and unpaid, and 
people increasing their supply of household work after retirement (Figures 10 and 
11). 
Figure 10. Option values at 55 years of age, the Netherlands, healthy 
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Figure 11. Option values at 55 years of age, the Netherlands, unhealthy 
Portugal. Portugal has raised the pensionable age for women from 62 to 65 over the 
period 1994-99. In reality, the early retirement scheme enables retirement at age 62, 
which is assumed here. 
Figure 12. Option value at 55 years of age, Portugal  
In Portugal the replacement rate is one of the highest, exceeding unity at age 63 even 
without domestic work. Domestic work is additionally greatly increased after 
withdrawal from work. On the other hand, the hourly value of domestic work (€1.5) is 
very low compared with the average (€5) for all countries. The wage rate applied here is 
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the mandatory minimum wage for domestic services, which may be lower than actual 
wages paid to domestic help. The additional domestic work after withdrawal from work 
is worth €680 for men and €1,100 for women. The overall result is that the individual 
has an incentive to continue to work throughout the working career, since the expected 
value for additional domestic work after retirement remains low. These findings fit well 
with the average later withdrawal at 66 years of age (Figure 12). 
The UK. The pensionable age is currently 65 for men and 60 for women. As a result of 
legislation passed in 1995, it will be gradually raised for women over a 10-year period, 
starting in 2010 for women who reach age 60 that year, until it is equalised for all in 
2020 at age 65 (O’Connell, 2002). In our calculations we have assumed pensionable age 
at 60 years owing to various early retirement arrangements leading to average 
retirement at 62 years for men and 61 years for women.  
In the UK, the value of additional household work after retirement is €4800 for men and 
€3600 for women among the healthy, while among the unhealthy the increase in 
domestic work supply is worth €2000 both for men and women. In the UK, we are only 
considering the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), by which about 25% 
of the labour force is covered. Private pension schemes constitute over half of total 
income in retirement in the UK (Gruber and Wise, 1999, p. 415). SERPS is currently 
going through a remodelling, where the original target replacement rate of 25% of the 
average earnings during the best 20 years is gradually changed to 20% of the lifetime 
average. The pension accrual rates are determined according to these target 
replacements, and here we assume the accrual rate under the new scheme. 
It is evident in Figures 13 and 14 that the low replacement rates, 71% for men and 81% 
for women, guarantee incentives to postpone retirement. At the low level of any tax 
difference, an individual is relatively indifferent with the timing of optimal retirement 
given the pensionable age of 60 for women and 65 for men. The effect of health status 
on option values comes from the smaller increase of household work in non-
employment spells, as the UK also represents the ‘normal’ time use with respect to 
health and labour force participation: the non-employed supply more household work 
and the healthy increase their supply by more than the unhealthy, and this results in a 
mere level effect of health status on option values. 
Figure 13. Option values at 55 years of age, the UK, healthy 
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Figure 14. Option values at 55 years of age, the UK, unhealthy 
 
6. Basic  results 
6.1  Regional differences in lifetime total work 
We first approach the question of whether the allocation of working time between 
the workplace, home and retirement schemes exhibit any dissimilarities among the 
countries that can potentially cause differences in retirement behaviour. Before 
drawing conclusions, a measure of dissimilarity between pairs of countries with 
respect to the time-use pattern is used.
4 This is done only for healthy persons, since 
the figures are most reliable for them. The measure is based on the Euclidean 
Distance, which describes the distance between two vector points in metric space 
(Chiang, 1984, p. 73).
 A similar method has been applied to examining differences in 
time use by Szalai (1972) and Harvey (1989). The measures of dissimilarity in Table 
18 are the square roots of squared differences in the mean weekly hours of paid and 
household work by employed men and women in pairs of countries. First, the hours 
of paid work and household work in one country is subtracted from the hours in 
another for all country pairs, separately for men and women. Then the same is 
repeated for household work. The smaller the difference in the measure of 
dissimilarity between two countries, the more similarity there is between the pair of 
countries. Respectively, a higher value indicates more dissimilarity. The matrix 
resembles a correlation matrix in the sense that each country is compared to every 
                                                 
4 Here 
2
12 1 D = ( )
k
i aa
= − ∑ , Szalai and Converse applied the measure to the proportions of 
different time use categories out of total time (Szalai, 1972, p. 142). 
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other country and that the measure of dissimilarity provides information on the 
relationship between the two. 
Table 19 reveals some differences among the countries, as was seen in the previous 
section. Since four time-use factors are included (paid work by men, paid work by 
women, household work by men and household work by women), the measure 
expresses the overall dissimilarity instead of differences in just one time-use category at 
a time, which is the case with Tables 10-12 in the previous section 4.2. If the welfare-
regime typology were an appropriate classification of these countries with respect to 
time use in paid and household work, the countries that belong to the same regime 
should result in a low value when compared with other countries in the regime. 
Table 19. Measures of dissimilarity (D) between pairs of countries in weekly hours 
of paid and household work by employed men and women (healthy) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Denmark has the most similarity to Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland. The low 
level of dissimilarity with Finland is expected to be based on the welfare-regime 
typology, but the low supply of household work in both countries explain the similarity 
to Belgium and while the gender allocation of work is very similar in Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
Finland has the greatest similarity to the Netherlands and partly to Portugal and the UK. 
The UK has the greatest similarity to Portugal, with the Netherlands and Finland 
following. All these countries can be characterised by relatively long hours of paid 
work. A second look at Tables 10, 12 and 13 also confirms that time use in household 
work and the total work hours, especially for women, are similar except for domestic 
work in Portugal. 
Among the continental countries Germany has dissimilarity measures indicating that it 
has the most in common with the Nordic countries and the least with the UK. Together 
with Finland and the Netherlands, Germany has the highest value when compared to 
Belgium, which in turn exhibits relatively high values on all comparisons. The UK and 
Portugal are the most dissimilar to both Germany and Belgium. The continental regime 
seems to contain countries with similar time-use patterns, but small countries such as 
the Netherlands are exceptions. 
The overall picture this exercise gives seems to indicate that time-use patterns follow 
the welfare-regime typology in a general sense. There seem to be two groups of 
Den Fin Bel Ger NL Por UK AVG
Den 0.00
Fin 7.98 0.00
Bel 3.42 11.13 0.00
Ger 8.76 8.26 11.66 0.00
NL 7.52 4.19 10.05 9.87 0.00
Por 10.52 7.97 11.82 14.72 6.83 0.00
UK 9.94 7.72 11.42 15.17 7.16 5.76 0.00
AVG 4.96 3.76 7.70 8.79 3.41 6.67 6.84 0.00AGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 49 
 
countries exhibiting mutual similarity: that of the UK and Portugal with Finland and the 
Netherlands on the one hand, and a group where Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark seem to be similar at least in some respects. Somewhat surprisingly, Germany 
seems to be left out of these groups. However, it could be considered a group of its own 
from which other continental countries deviate, since the Netherlands and Belgium 
associate with different groups: the Netherlands associates with Finland, the UK and 
Portugal and Belgium aligns closer to Denmark because of the low household work 
supply. When analysing differences in time use one can define the following typology: 
1)  Central Europe, which has relatively fewer paid work hours (Germany and 
Belgium) and average domestic work hours (Germany); 
2)  small countries (Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal) and the UK, which have 
more paid work hours and more domestic work hours for men (except for Portugal) 
and more domestic work hours for women; and  
3)  exceptions, such as Denmark, which have relatively little domestic work, but with 
some similarity to the Nordic regime and Belgium, with little domestic work (for 
women as well, contrary to expectations about the continental regime). 
It is evident that the small number of countries does not allow for a deeper analysis of 
the southern regime (Portugal, Spain and Greece) or to make any definite conclusions 
about the Nordic regime (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway). What we can see is 
some similarity among continental countries and another group that includes the UK 
and the smaller countries, with the Nordic regime somewhat distinct from the others. 
6.2  Time use by gender and employment status 
We found clear differences in time use with respect to employment status, gender and 
country. The non-employed both spend more time at home and supply more household 
work than the employed. Women supply more household work than men do, regardless 
of employment status, but the allocation is more equal among the non-employed. 
Respectively, men supply more paid work than women do. Thus men and women 
contribute equally to total work in most countries. This shows the relevance of 
considering the allocation of the total work between paid work and domestic work. 
Leisure time is relatively less affected when domestic work substitutes paid work after 
retirement. This leads us to believe the specialisation of work to be an important issue, 
as Becker initially emphasised. The ‘continuity of lifetime patterns’ hypothesis does not 
hold for domestic work, since it is clearly an alternative for paid work after retirement. 
The dual burden of paid work and domestic work is, in any case, a less-compelling issue 
in making the retirement decision, while for young families with small children it can be 
more relevant. 
It is true, however, that total work time (paid and domestic work) and thus the dual 
burden decreases after withdrawal from work, but by less than is often considered. In 
most of the countries changes in the amount of domestic work are even greater for men 
than for women when withdrawing from work. The time-use patterns of women and 
men become more similar after retirement. For men the increase in domestic work after 
withdrawal from the labour market is larger in relative terms (doubles on average) and 50 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
the effect of accounting for domestic work on the financial incentive to retire is greater 
for them. Men start from a position of spending 10 hours less in domestic work 
activities and hence the economic value of the change in domestic work is greater for 
men in the decision to retire. This can be explained by the gender specialisation of work 
and women’s continuity of lifetime patterns: men supply more paid work before 
retirement while women specialise in domestic work. After retirement, women’s time 
use changes by less than men’s. In economic terms, the higher marginal value of non-
work time follows from paid work and leisure work being more complementary and 
from the relatively high substitution elasticity between consumption and domestic work. 
Earlier we discussed regional differences. In countries where the relative increase in 
the supply of household work after retirement is larger for men than for women, 
earlier retirement is more attractive to men. This is, in fact, evident in all countries 
except for the UK. Accounting for the value of household work yields on average 
40% higher replacement rates, close to 100%, and respectively lower option values 
for retirement. A 30% decrease in the full replacement rate induces an increase in the 
employment rate of those aged 55-64 by 10%. Although the replacement rates with 
full incomes are rather similar for men and women, the option values for postponed 
retirement are for this reason lower for men than for women. 
Household work therefore greatly encourages early retirement. The country differences 
in the incentives to retire are visible first in the varying values of household work, 
measured with the net hourly wage for this kind of work in each country. Second, the 
tax, social security and pension systems in each country produce different option-value 
paths for retirement. Their effect can further be reinforced by characteristics of time-use 
patterns. For example, in countries where the relative increase in the supply of 
household work after retirement is larger for men than for women, early retirement is 
relatively more attractive for men. This is, in fact, evident in all countries except for the 
UK. 
6.3  Country regimes in retirement incentives 
Differences among the countries in time use are still substantial. However, the time-use 
patterns follow the welfare-regime typology in a vague sense. Continental Europe 
(Germany) is distinct and the small continental countries – the Netherlands and Belgium 
also show some similarity to Germany. The Nordic regime also seems clearly apparent. 
Portugal is different from the other countries with little domestic work by men and an 
average amount for women, but time-use is still similar to that in the UK. Southern 
Europe does not, hence, show up here as a different regime in time use although other 
factors typical for southern Europe may explain later retirement. 
In retirement schemes, continental Europe (Germany) exhibits a system of its own 
with high replacement rates and flat option-value curves after the pensionable age. 
Most of the other countries studied are small and differ in pension schemes. These 
are categorised as those with: 
1)  regimes with a high replacement rate and a flat option-value curve after the 
pensionable age – Central Europe (Germany), Finland and Portugal; AGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 51 
 
2)  regimes with a high replacement rate and a downward sloping option-value curve 
after the pensionable age (Belgium and the Netherlands); 
3)  regimes with a low replacement rate and a rising option value after the pensionable 
age (Denmark and the UK). 
6.4 Retirement  incentives 
Incentives to retire depend in general on two things. First, higher replacement rates and 
pension wealth enhance the incentive for early retirement. Second, retirement incentives 
depend on earned income prospects with the foregone domestic work. Since the 
expected lifetime at age 65 is limited, around 12 years for men and 17 years for women 
(when considered at age 55), pension accruals after pensionable age must be relatively 
high in order for the option value to be flat. This is especially true with high pension 
wealth (replacement rate), since additional income from work is of low importance. 
Pension wealth accrual has to be greatly enhanced in order for the postponement of 
retirement to become attractive. An example of this is the new pension scheme in 
Finland, where pension wealth stays the same irrespective of the decision to retire and 
pension wealth accrual at age 63-67 is high at 4.5% annually. Hence, the new system 
leads to indifference on the part of the individual with regard to when to retire. 
With low replacement rates it is possible that the option value after pensionable age 
slopes upward. The reason is the high value of extra income earned as opposed to the 
accumulation of pension wealth. Such is the case in the UK and Denmark, where 
option-value curves are upward-sloping after retirement age. 
It is evident that in the country typology, Central Europe remains a distinct regime. The 
pension scheme is relatively generous but it is partly outweighed by enhanced pension 
wealth accrual around age 65. Domestic work supply is relatively fixed over a lifetime, 
which explains why replacement rates do not exceed 100% before age 67.  
Small countries and the UK also show distinct pension scheme systems that can be 
divided into three groups. In Finland and Portugal, domestic work increases a lot after 
withdrawal from work and replacement rates are high. Portugal differs still from other 
countries owing to a later retirement age. This can be explained by its time-use patterns, 
which are typical for the southern regime. The Netherlands and Belgium have no 
additional pension wealth accrual, after achieving the maximum replacement rate well 
before pensionable age. The domestic work also has a relatively significant increase 
after retirement. The value of foregone domestic work explains the low option-values 
for continuing to work and in the absence of pension accrual incentives the option-value 
curves slope downwards.  
The countries with a low replacement rate such as Denmark and the UK or countries 
with low pension wealth such as Portugal can be most successful in achieving the 
objective of postponed retirement. On the other hand, in many countries, private 
pension schemes are important (as in the UK) or private pension savings are heavily 
tax-subsidised (as in Denmark), so inclusion of the financial incentives from private 
schemes may alter the results. 52 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
6.5 Health  status 
Whereas the time spent by healthy persons on domestic work is a more significant 
determinant of retirement for men, health status could be viewed as more important for 
women. If women value domestic work more highly than men do, they might be more 
prone to retire early for health reasons in order to be able to catch the benefit from 
domestic work while still able perform household chores. The effect of health on 
retirement incentives indeed differs between genders. For men, the replacement rates 
inclusive of the value of domestic work are lower for unhealthy men (84% on average) 
than for their healthy counterparts. Unhealthy women have instead on average higher 
replacement rates (95%) than healthy women (84%). One reason is that women adjust 
their work supply by less with respect to health status and in some cases, in fact, 
unhealthy women supply more domestic work than healthy women do – an average of 
32 hours per week. Thus unhealthy women clearly have a relatively high total work 
burden.  
It is generally argued that individuals with poor health may be forced to leave the labour 
force. It has been shown that women in poor health have clear incentives to leave the 
labour force, because of the high value of non-work time in household work and their 
high total work burden. More flexible working hours and part-time retirement are key to 
maintaining high employment rates for women with poor health. An important target 
group for men are also those with good health, since those with poor health already 
adjust their labour supply.  
In the small country group (Netherlands but also including the UK), health has the 
largest influence on labour supply. Men reporting bad or bad health work 20 hours 
less per week in the Netherlands and UK. Women reporting bad health work 4 to 6 
hours less per week. In other countries the effects are minor or even opposite (for 
Danish women). We can explain country differences or differences between genders 
by at least four alternative points of view. The first possible explanation is 
justification hypothesis (Bound, 1991). Those with poor health justify low labour 
force participation by bad health. The disability pension rules can vary across 
countries explaining also the need for justification. The justification hypothesis has 
been also used to explain why women report more bad health than men. We, 
however, use fairly objective measure of health so that this should not play a crucial 
role. Health status had to also be estimated in other countries except for Finland. 
Poor health thus captures the time use effects of poor labour market status or being 
single that correlate with it. The second related reason can be institutions and labour 
market characteristics. The Netherlands have high share of part-time workers. Those 
with poor health have a clear alternative to lower their work burden. It is also clear 
that household work can play a greater role in The Netherlands compared to 
Scandinavian countries. A third explanation can be explained by considering health 
as one consumption bundle following Grossman’s model (1972). Health as a 
consumption bundle works as a clear substitute for paid work. Those with poor 
health need to consume health more and can do this only by reducing paid work 
hours. Moreover, health as a consumption bundle can be a clear complement for 
unpaid household work, especially for women. It appears that household work 
supply is strikingly high for women in poor health both in the Netherlands and in AGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 53 
 
United Kingdom. Finally, in Grossman’s approach health is also considered as a 
lifetime investment. Health capital corresponds to human capital so that it decays 
over time and requires continuing investment. The final point of view is then the 
possible different needs to invest in health capital and in time horizons in health 
capital between the countries. The Netherlands and United Kingdom may appear to 
be countries with fairly good health services in the event of bad health. Thus there 
may appear less need for working longer in order to provide funds for covering the 
likely health expenses in the future when being already currently in bad health. 
 
The common European concern over the challenges presented by the demographic 
ageing pattern and the falling labour force participation rates of the older age groups 
in European economies has prompted an effort towards a better understanding of the 
retirement decision process. The result obtained in this work – that accounting for 
the value of household work in financial incentive calculations makes early 
retirement more attractive – gives a partial explanation to the low average 
withdrawal ages from the labour force presented in Table 1. In fact, the exact 
optimal path for retirement, when planned at age 55, can be quite close to the actual 
average retirement in countries with low option-values such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands (men). In some countries with high option values for continuing to work 
(notably Germany and Finland), pension wealth can, however, be so high as to 
enable the individual to retire. The incentive may not be effective if pension wealth 
does not constrain the possibility of early retirement. The additional pension income 
must indeed be around 5% per year for it to be desirable to postpone retirement from 
a financial point of view. The reason is the relatively short span of life left at age 65.  
 
It is also clear that people consider other incentives in addition to financial ones. 
Individual characteristics, such as the health status and own perception of life 
expectancy, arguably have a strong effect on the retirement behaviour of older 
persons. As a minimum, this study indicates that any incentive calculation may fail if 
the untaxed income from domestic work is not taken into account.  
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Appendix A. Tax Wedges 
We can write the observed gross wages in the market as 
(1 ) o ww s =+    (A.1) 
  o w  = wages with no employer’s social security tax  
  s = employer’s social security tax  
  w= observed gross wages 
New wages of employees are 
(1 ) n wwm =−    (A.2) 
  m  = average wage tax rate 
Assuming that incomes are used for consumption  
(1 ) nc ww k =+    (A.3) 
  k  = average consumption tax rate based on pre-tax  
    price of consumption 
These give for the total average tax rate 
1
(1 )
1
(1 )
oo
c
m
ws w ww k M
ww s
−
+− − + ==
+
 (A.4) 
1
1
(1 )(1 )
m
M
sk
−
⇔= −
++
 (A.5) 
This can be decomposed into three components  
s mk M MMM =++   (A.6) 
where  
(1 ) 1
s
ws s
M
ws s
==
++
 the effect of employer’s social security lowering gross wages 
(1 ) 1
m
wm m
M
ws s
==
++
 the effect of wage tax rate 
/(1 ) (1 ) /(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) 1
co
k
wk wk k mk k
M
ws ws s
+ −+
== =
++ +
 the effect of consumption tax rate.  
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Appendix B. Logistic Models for Health 
Table B1. Logistic model for poor health status for those aged 45–64 in Denmark 
Men 
employed
Men Non-
employed
Women 
employed
Women Non-
employed
Age 0.80 0.95 -0.45 -0.86
(1.16) (0.97) (-0.69) (-1.03)
Age2 -0.0074 -0.0093 0.0042 0.0071
(-1.16) (-1.06) (0.68) (0.96)
Highly educated 1.55 0.34 -1.66
(1.34) (0.78) (-0.82)
Income percentile 25-75 -0.38 -0.36 -0.75 -0.89
(-1.07) (-0.52) (-1.04) (2.32)*
Income percentile 75-90 -1.99 -1.93 -0.42 1.37
(-2.49)* (-2.13)* (-1.04) (1.41)
Income percentile 90-100 -0.22 -2.03 -1.00 1.06
(-0.26) (-1.83) (-1.73) (1.63)
Child < 18 years 0.07 0.87 -0.25 1.27
(0.14) (-0.82) (-0.44) (0.85)
40+hrs a week 0.07 0.14
(0.18) (0.3)
Married 0.03 0.65 0.16 0.59
(-0.06) (-0.91) (0.35) (-2.71)
Observations 480 127 449 203
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.07
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table B2. Logistic model for poor health status for those aged 45–64 in Germany 
Men 
employed
Men Non-
employed
Women 
employed
Women Non-
employed
Age -0.04 0.65 -0.21 0.96
(-0.1) (1.23) (-0.44) (2.56)*
Age2 0.0011 -0.0058 0.0020 -0.0082
(0.3) (-1.23) (0.44) (-2.39)*
Highly educated
Income percentile 25-75 -0.11 -0.27 -0.27 -0.17
(-0.51) (-0.82) (-0.92) (-0.63)
Income percentile 75-90 -0.49 -0.43 -0.08 0.04
(-1.71) (-1.06) (-0.21) (0.13)
Income percentile 90-100 -0.85 -0.71 -0.98 0.04
(-2.48)* (-1.18) (-2.14)* (0.1)
Child < 18 years -0.12 0.57 -0.02 0.11
(-0.4) (0.83) (-0.03) (0.3)
40+hrs a week -0.22 0.27
(-1.21) (1.17)
Married 0.23 -0.45 0.11 0.14
(0.72) (-1.14) (0.35) (0.47)
Observations 1133 583 826 939
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table B3. Logistic model for poor health status for those aged 45–64 in the 
Netherlands 
Men 
employed
Men Non-
employed
Women 
employed
Women Non-
employed
Age -0.02 -0.62 -0.81 0.22
(-0.05) (-0.85) (-1.3) (0.7)
Age2 0.0002 0.0041 0.0078 -0.0017
(0.05) (0.63) (1.3) (-0.61)
Highly educated -1.50 -1.27 0.61
(-1.43) (-0.83) (0.75)
Income percentile 25-75 -0.15 -0.57 -0.06 -0.07
(-0.63) (-1.68) (-0.2) (-0.34)
Income percentile 75-90 -0.47 -0.76 -0.74 0.13
(-1.43) (-1.71) (-1.6) (0.5)
Income percentile 90-100 0.14 0.00 0.11 -0.18
(0.39) (0) (0.25) (-0.58)
Child < 18 years -0.13 0.48 -0.18 -0.57
(-0.5) (1.11) (-0.53) (-2.44)*
40+hrs a week -0.60 -0.46
(-2.52)* (-0.77)
Married -0.25 0.72 -0.33 -0.32
(-0.81) (2.09)* (-1.01) (-1.4)
Observations 1037 350 562 878
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.02
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table B4. Logistic model for poor health status for those aged 45–64 in the UK 
Men 
employed
Men Non-
employed
Women 
employed
Women Non-
employed
Age 1.27 0.07 0.69 1.15
(2.01)* (0.14) (1.3) (2.92)**
Age2 -0.0113 -0.0004 -0.0063 -0.0104
(-1.93) (-0.09) (-1.29) (-2.93)**
Highly educated -1.54 0.80
(-1.23) (0.57)
Income percentile 25-75 -0.87 -0.26 -0.23 -0.06
(-2.19)* (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.25)
Income percentile 75-90 -0.58 -0.88 -1.07 -0.35
(-1.09) (-1.97)* (-2.19)* (-1.03)
Income percentile 90-100 -1.76 -2.11 0.03 -0.52
(-2.11) (-3.46)** (0.07) (-1.2)
Child < 18 years 0.64 0.30 0.60 -0.38
(1.12) (0.61) (0.99) (-0.85)
40+hrs a week -0.73 -0.08
(-2.06)* (-0.27)
Married -0.57 0.30 0.19 -0.40
(-1.26) (0.88) (0.66) (-1.53)
Observations 814 331 715 619
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.03
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Appendix C. OECD Country Tables for All (2002) 
Table C1. Incentive calculations, Belgium average earnings men, all 
 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 5.81 8.24
56 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 11.63 16.49
57 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 17.44 24.73
58 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 23.25 32.97
59 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 29.06 41.22
60 1.04 0.75 292.93 216.66 … … … … 13.27 33.48
61 1.04 0.75 271.33 200.68 -21.60 -15.98 -254.75 -187.26 -1.88 26.22
62 1.04 0.75 250.36 185.17 -20.97 -15.51 -247.33 -181.81 -16.43 19.40
63 1.04 0.75 229.99 170.11 -20.36 -15.06 -240.13 -176.51 -30.39 13.02
64 1.04 0.75 210.23 155.49 -19.77 -14.62 -233.13 -171.37 -43.77 7.07
65 1.04 0.75 191.04 141.30 -19.19 -14.19 -226.34 -166.38 -56.59 1.53
66 1.04 0.75 172.40 127.52 -18.63 -13.78 -219.75 -161.53 -68.86 -3.60
67 1.04 0.75 154.31 114.14 -18.09 -13.38 -213.35 -156.83 -80.62 -8.35
68 1.04 0.75 146.20 108.62 -18.09 -13.38 -213.35 -156.83 -91.85 -12.72
69 1.04 0.75 128.87 95.79 -17.56 -12.99 -207.13 -152.26 -102.60 -16.72
70 1.04 0.75 112.05 83.33 -17.05 -12.61 -201.10 -26.93 -112.86 -20.37
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.24 1.16
Retired 3.59 6.23
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Option Value Tax/Subsidy  (%) Accrual Pension Wealth  
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Table C2. Incentive calculations, Belgium average earnings women, all 
 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… 2 . 5 7 6 . 6 3
56 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… 5 . 1 4 1 3 . 2 6
57 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… 7 . 7 1 1 9 . 9 0
58 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… 1 0 . 2 7 2 6 . 5 3
59 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… 1 2 . 8 4 3 3 . 1 6
60 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 6 4 1 5 . 2 7 2 7 3 . 6 9………… - 9 . 8 9 2 3 . 1 2
61 1.37 0.86 389.97 260.49 -25.30 -16.67 -414.38 -277.57 -31.88 13.56
62 1.37 0.86 365.41 244.21 -24.56 -16.19 -402.31 -269.49 -53.16 4.48
63 1.37 0.86 341.57 228.39 -23.85 -15.72 -390.60 -261.64 -73.74 -4.15
64 1.37 0.86 318.41 213.04 -23.15 -15.26 -379.22 -254.02 -93.65 -12.33
65 1.37 0.86 295.94 198.13 -22.48 -14.81 -368.17 -246.62 -112.90 -20.08
66 1.37 0.86 274.12 183.66 -21.82 -14.38 -357.45 -239.44 -131.52 -27.41
67 1.37 0.86 252.93 169.61 -21.19 -13.96 -347.04 -232.46 -149.52 -34.34
68 1.37 0.86 232.36 155.97 -20.57 -13.56 -336.93 -225.69 -166.93 -40.87
69 1.37 0.86 212.39 142.72 -19.97 -13.16 -327.12 -219.12 -183.75 -47.02
70 1.37 0.86 193.00 129.86 -19.39 -12.78 -317.59 -25.46 -200.00 -52.79
Earnings Domestic
Employed 6.63 1.75
Retired 5.47 5.81
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Option Value Tax/Subsidy  (%) Accrual Pension Wealth 
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Table C3. Incentive calculations, Denmark average earnings men, healthy 
    
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 7 8 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 1 0 . 9 5 1 1 . 8 1
56 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 2 1 . 9 0 3 0 . 4 4
57 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 3 2 . 8 5 4 5 . 6 7
58 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 4 3 . 8 0 6 0 . 8 9
59 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 5 4 . 7 5 7 6 . 1 1
60 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 6 5 . 7 0 9 1 . 3 3
61 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 8 1 4 2 . 7 7 8 0 . 2 3………… 6 5 . 6 1 1 0 0 . 3 5
62 0.82 0.48 131.73 74.03 -11.03 -6.20 -75.25 -43.32 65.85 109.56
63 0.82 0.48 121.02 68.01 -10.71 -6.02 -73.06 -42.06 66.39 118.93
64 0.82 0.48 110.62 62.17 -10.40 -5.85 -70.93 -40.83 77.04 141.29
65 0.90 0.58 110.31 69.30 -0.31 7.13 -4.24 46.62 77.23 149.75
66 0.90 0.58 99.55 62.54 -10.76 -6.76 -73.16 -46.90 77.73 158.41
67 0.90 0.58 89.11 55.98 -10.45 -6.56 -71.03 -45.54 78.54 167.26
68 0.90 0.58 78.96 49.61 -10.14 -6.37 -68.96 -44.21 79.64 176.30
69 0.90 0.58 69.12 43.42 -9.85 -6.19 -66.95 -42.92 81.63 186.31
70 0.91 0.59 60.16 38.21 -8.96 -5.21 -60.91 -15.76 83.21 195.58
Earnings Domestic
Employed 15.22 4.67
Retired 6.66 8.94
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Tax/Subsidy  (%) Accrual Pension Wealth Replacement Rate  
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Table C4. Incentive calculations, Denmark average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 1 4 . 0 3 1 1 . 8 1
56 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 2 8 . 0 5 3 0 . 4 4
57 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 4 2 . 0 8 4 5 . 6 7
58 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 5 6 . 1 1 6 0 . 8 9
59 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 7 0 . 1 3 7 6 . 1 1
60 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 8 4 . 1 6 9 1 . 3 3
61 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 8 1 1 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 2 3………… 8 9 . 5 2 1 0 0 . 3 5
62 0.65 0.48 103.51 74.03 -8.67 -6.20 -59.32 -43.32 95.13 109.56
63 0.65 0.48 95.10 68.01 -8.42 -6.02 -57.59 -42.06 100.98 118.93
64 0.65 0.48 86.92 62.17 -8.17 -5.85 -55.91 -40.83 117.21 141.29
65 0.73 0.58 89.13 69.30 2.20 7.13 12.80 46.62 122.54 149.75
66 0.73 0.58 80.43 62.54 -8.69 -6.76 -59.25 -46.90 128.13 158.41
67 0.73 0.58 71.99 55.98 -8.44 -6.56 -57.52 -45.54 133.96 167.26
68 0.73 0.58 63.80 49.61 -8.19 -6.37 -55.85 -44.21 140.04 176.30
69 0.73 0.58 55.84 43.42 -7.96 -6.19 -54.22 -42.92 146.96 186.31
70 0.74 0.59 48.75 38.21 -7.10 -5.21 -48.38 -15.76 153.39 195.58
Earnings Domestic
Employed 15.22 3.98
Retired 6.66 5.17
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
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Table C5. Incentive calculations, Denmark average earnings women, healthy 
    
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 1 1 . 5 6 1 3 . 0 5
56 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 2 3 . 1 2 2 6 . 1 1
57 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 3 4 . 6 8 3 9 . 1 6
58 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 4 6 . 2 4 5 2 . 2 2
59 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 5 7 . 8 0 6 5 . 2 7
60 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 6 9 . 3 6 7 8 . 3 3
61 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 6 9 3 . 3 8 8 2 . 6 8………… 7 4 . 8 2 8 5 . 9 9
62 0.78 0.56 87.28 77.28 -6.09 -5.40 -46.14 -44.58 80.46 93.81
63 0.78 0.56 81.37 72.04 -5.92 -5.24 -44.80 -43.28 86.28 101.78
64 0.78 0.56 75.62 66.96 -5.74 -5.09 -43.49 -42.02 103.18 123.51
65 0.86 0.68 80.96 75.64 5.34 8.68 46.46 68.19 108.48 130.72
66 0.86 0.68 74.70 69.79 -6.26 -5.85 -47.85 -48.03 114.10 138.61
67 0.86 0.69 68.77 64.63 -5.94 -5.16 -45.67 -42.42 119.75 146.11
68 0.86 0.69 62.86 59.08 -5.91 -5.55 -45.17 -45.64 125.57 153.77
69 0.86 0.69 57.12 53.68 -5.74 -5.39 -43.85 -44.31 132.18 161.89
70 0.64 0.54 52.17 48.74 -4.95 -4.94 -36.88 -30.37 138.26 169.83
Earnings Domestic
Employed 13.05 6.55
Retired 6.70 8.04
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual  
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Table C6. Incentive calculations, Denmark average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 7 . 9 9 1 4 . 5 6
56 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 1 5 . 9 8 2 9 . 1 1
57 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 2 3 . 9 6 4 3 . 6 7
58 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 3 1 . 9 5 5 8 . 2 2
59 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 3 9 . 9 4 7 2 . 7 8
60 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 4 7 . 9 3 8 7 . 3 3
61 0 . 9 7 0 . 5 0 1 6 6 . 1 8 1 1 4 . 7 4………… 4 5 . 0 7 9 4 . 4 0
62 0.97 0.50 155.34 107.26 -10.84 -7.49 -71.21 -54.91 42.53 101.69
63 0.97 0.50 144.81 99.99 -10.53 -7.27 -69.13 -53.31 40.30 109.18
64 0.97 0.50 134.59 92.93 -10.22 -7.06 -67.12 -51.76 55.08 136.69
65 1.04 0.61 141.38 105.88 6.79 12.95 56.51 90.08 52.14 143.06
66 1.04 0.61 130.46 97.70 -10.93 -8.18 -72.67 -59.63 49.72 150.39
67 1.05 0.62 120.04 90.47 -10.41 -7.23 -69.54 -52.65 47.39 157.17
68 1.05 0.62 109.73 82.69 -10.32 -7.78 -68.59 -56.66 45.36 164.18
69 1.05 0.62 99.71 75.15 -10.02 -7.55 -66.59 -55.01 44.58 171.82
70 0.78 0.48 90.94 68.23 -8.77 -6.92 -56.85 -37.10 43.02 179.21
Earnings Domestic
Employed 14.56 7.36
Retired 6.67 13.93
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C7. Incentive calculations, Finland average earnings men, healthy 
    
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0.90 0.40 215.40 101.99 … … … … 12.62 19.90
56 0.92 0.44 220.67 110.97 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 25.23 39.80
57 0.94 0.47 225.94 119.96 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 37.85 59.70
58 0.96 0.51 231.21 128.94 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 50.46 79.60
59 0.98 0.54 236.49 137.92 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 63.08 99.50
60 1.00 0.58 241.76 146.91 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 75.69 119.40
61 1.02 0.61 247.03 155.89 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 88.31 139.30
62 1.04 0.65 252.30 164.88 5.27 8.98 56.81 97.80 96.01 170.36
63 1.12 0.78 252.65 185.02 0.35 20.15 -2.68 219.34 91.77 180.52
64 1.16 0.85 241.08 184.27 -11.58 -0.75 -131.05 -8.18 86.82 188.90
65 1.19 0.91 228.78 181.73 -12.30 -2.54 -138.68 -27.64 81.18 195.57
66 1.23 0.97 215.79 177.49 -12.99 -4.24 -145.88 -46.18 74.89 200.62
67 1.26 1.03 202.16 171.63 -13.63 -5.86 -152.67 -63.84 67.99 204.13
68 1.30 1.09 187.92 164.22 -14.24 -7.41 -159.07 -80.66 60.52 206.17
69 1.33 1.16 173.10 155.34 -14.82 -8.88 -165.10 -96.67 49.24 201.25
70 1.34 1.17 154.48 139.51 -18.62 -15.83 -205.88 -172.33 78.66 227.84
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.65 6.53
Retired 3.56 10.11
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value  
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Table C8. Incentive calculations, Finland average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 8 9 0 . 4 0 2 1 3 . 1 0 1 0 1 . 9 9………… 1 2 . 6 1 1 9 . 9 0
56 0.91 0.44 218.13 110.97 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 25.22 39.80
57 0.93 0.47 223.16 119.96 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 37.83 59.70
58 0.95 0.51 228.20 128.94 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 50.44 79.60
59 0.97 0.54 233.23 137.92 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 63.05 99.50
60 0.99 0.58 238.26 146.91 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 75.65 119.40
61 1.01 0.61 243.29 155.89 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 88.26 139.30
62 1.03 0.65 248.32 164.88 5.03 8.98 54.19 97.80 95.62 170.36
63 1.10 0.78 248.10 185.02 -0.22 20.15 -8.83 219.34 91.61 180.52
64 1.13 0.85 236.51 184.27 -11.59 -0.75 -131.09 -8.18 86.93 188.90
65 1.17 0.91 224.25 181.73 -12.26 -2.54 -138.19 -27.64 81.60 195.57
66 1.20 0.97 211.35 177.49 -12.90 -4.24 -144.88 -46.18 75.68 200.62
67 1.24 1.03 197.85 171.63 -13.50 -5.86 -151.19 -63.84 69.18 204.13
68 1.27 1.09 183.77 164.22 -14.07 -7.41 -157.14 -80.66 62.15 206.17
69 1.30 1.16 169.17 155.34 -14.61 -8.88 -162.73 -96.67 51.51 201.25
70 1.31 1.17 150.95 139.51 -18.22 -15.83 -201.47 -172.33 41.18 196.39
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.65 7.29
Retired 3.56 10.63
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
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Table C9. Incentive calculations, Finland average earnings women, healthy 
    
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 1 . 0 0 0 . 3 6 9 1 . 1 0 8 0 . 4 3………… 1 2 . 2 1 1 5 . 8 2
56 1.02 0.39 99.13 87.51 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 24.41 31.64
57 1.03 0.42 107.15 94.60 8.02 7.08 83.67 74.92 36.62 47.46
58 1.04 0.46 115.18 101.68 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 48.82 63.28
59 1.05 0.49 123.20 108.77 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 61.03 79.10
60 1.07 0.52 131.23 115.85 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 73.23 94.92
61 1.08 0.55 139.25 122.93 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 85.44 110.74
62 1.09 0.58 147.27 130.02 8.02 7.08 104.55 93.84 109.91 137.39
63 1.14 0.71 167.56 147.93 20.28 17.91 264.29 237.21 115.99 147.81
64 1.16 0.76 169.47 149.61 1.91 1.68 24.85 22.31 120.76 157.06
65 1.18 0.82 170.06 150.13 0.59 0.52 7.67 6.88 124.28 165.21
66 1.21 0.87 169.39 149.54 -0.67 -0.59 -8.71 -7.81 126.59 172.30
67 1.23 0.93 167.52 147.89 -1.87 -1.65 -24.31 -21.82 127.77 178.38
68 1.25 0.99 164.52 145.24 -3.01 -2.65 -39.16 -35.15 127.86 183.51
69 1.27 1.04 160.43 141.63 -4.09 -3.61 -53.30 -47.84 120.97 182.47
70 1.28 1.06 149.36 131.86 -11.07 -9.77 -144.18 -129.40 157.53 220.80
Earnings Domestic
Employed 7.21 11.06
Retired 3.56 10.11
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%)  
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Table C10. Incentive calculations, Finland average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 1 . 0 1 0 . 4 2 1 4 2 . 0 8 1 5 0 . 1 4………… 1 9 . 0 2 2 5 . 3 8
56 1.03 0.46 154.59 163.37 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 38.05 50.75
57 1.05 0.49 167.11 176.59 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 57.07 76.13
58 1.07 0.53 179.62 189.82 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 76.10 101.51
59 1.09 0.57 192.14 203.04 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 95.12 126.88
60 1.11 0.60 204.65 216.26 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 114.15 152.26
61 1.13 0.64 217.17 229.49 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 133.17 177.64
62 1.15 0.68 229.68 242.71 12.51 13.22 125.09 131.87 171.32 223.22
63 1.22 0.82 261.31 276.14 31.63 33.43 316.20 333.35 180.80 238.51
64 1.25 0.89 264.29 279.29 2.97 3.14 29.74 31.35 188.23 251.63
65 1.28 0.95 265.21 280.26 0.92 0.97 9.17 9.67 193.70 262.68
66 1.32 1.02 264.17 279.16 -1.04 -1.10 -10.42 -10.98 197.30 271.76
67 1.35 1.08 261.26 276.08 -2.91 -3.07 -29.08 -30.66 199.12 278.96
68 1.38 1.15 256.57 271.13 -4.69 -4.95 -46.85 -49.39 199.25 284.37
69 1.42 1.21 250.19 264.39 -6.38 -6.74 -63.77 -67.23 188.51 278.28
70 1.43 1.23 232.93 246.15 -17.26 -18.24 -172.50 -181.86 177.82 272.26
Earnings Domestic
Employed 9.47 9.28
Retired 3.56 10.63
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C11. Incentive calculations, Finland (old system) average earnings men, healthy 
  
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 8 5 0 . 4 1 2 3 0 . 6 9 1 1 7 . 6 7………… 9 . 8 7 1 4 . 8 4
56 0.86 0.42 233.22 121.59 2.53 3.92 45.00 78.05 19.74 29.68
57 0.87 0.44 235.74 125.51 2.53 3.92 45.00 78.05 29.61 44.51
58 0.88 0.45 238.27 129.44 2.53 3.92 45.00 78.05 39.48 59.35
59 0.88 0.46 240.80 133.36 2.53 3.92 45.00 78.05 49.35 74.19
60 0.89 0.48 243.32 137.28 2.53 3.92 45.00 78.05 44.13 81.89
61 0.91 0.50 230.76 134.07 -12.57 -3.21 -310.53 -63.89 38.83 89.01
62 0.92 0.52 218.11 130.27 -12.64 -3.80 -309.32 -75.62 33.47 95.57
63 0.94 0.55 205.41 125.91 -12.70 -4.36 -308.00 -86.76 24.94 96.75
64 0.94 0.55 189.53 116.18 -15.88 -9.73 -362.12 -193.65 16.87 98.22
65 0.94 0.55 174.12 106.73 -15.41 -9.45 -351.57 -188.01 9.25 99.96
66 0.94 0.55 159.15 97.56 -14.97 -9.17 -341.33 -182.53 2.06 101.97
67 0.94 0.55 144.62 88.65 -14.53 -8.91 -331.39 -177.22 -4.70 104.24
68 0.94 0.55 130.52 80.00 -14.11 -8.65 -321.74 -172.06 -11.05 106.76
69 0.94 0.55 116.82 71.61 -13.70 -8.39 -312.37 -167.04 -17.01 109.52
70 0.94 0.55 103.53 63.46 -13.30 -8.15 -303.27 -162.18 -22.57 112.53
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.81 6.53
Retired 3.83 10.11
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%)  
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Table C12. Incentive calculations, Finland (old system) average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 8 4 0 . 4 1 2 2 9 . 0 4 1 1 7 . 6 7………… 1 0 . 0 1 1 4 . 8 4
56 0.85 0.42 231.46 121.59 2.43 3.92 42.92 78.05 20.01 29.68
57 0.86 0.44 233.89 125.51 2.43 3.92 42.92 78.05 30.02 44.51
58 0.87 0.45 236.32 129.44 2.43 3.92 42.92 78.05 40.02 59.35
59 0.88 0.46 238.75 133.36 2.43 3.92 42.92 78.05 50.03 74.19
60 0.88 0.48 241.17 137.28 2.43 3.92 42.92 78.05 45.03 81.89
61 0.90 0.50 228.60 134.07 -12.58 -3.21 -309.18 -63.89 39.97 89.01
62 0.91 0.52 215.97 130.27 -12.63 -3.80 -307.64 -75.62 34.87 95.57
63 0.93 0.55 203.29 125.91 -12.68 -4.36 -306.02 -86.76 26.74 96.75
64 0.93 0.55 187.58 116.18 -15.71 -9.73 -357.27 -193.65 19.06 98.22
65 0.93 0.55 172.32 106.73 -15.25 -9.45 -346.87 -188.01 11.83 99.96
66 0.93 0.55 157.51 97.56 -14.81 -9.17 -336.77 -182.53 5.03 101.97
67 0.93 0.55 143.13 88.65 -14.38 -8.91 -326.96 -177.22 -1.36 104.24
68 0.93 0.55 129.17 80.00 -13.96 -8.65 -317.43 -172.06 -7.33 106.76
69 0.93 0.55 115.62 71.61 -13.55 -8.39 -308.19 -167.04 -12.91 109.52
70 0.93 0.55 102.46 63.46 -13.16 -8.15 -299.21 -162.18 -18.11 112.53
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.81 7.29
Retired 3.83 10.63
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
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Table C13. Incentive calculations, Finland (old system) average earnings women, healthy 
    
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 7 0 . 3 9 1 0 2 . 6 7 1 0 7 . 3 2………… 7 . 6 0 1 1 . 8 9
56 0.97 0.40 106.09 110.89 3.42 3.15 37.17 34.29 15.21 23.78
57 0.98 0.42 109.51 114.47 3.42 3.15 27.41 25.22 22.81 35.67
58 0.98 0.43 112.93 118.05 3.42 3.15 37.17 34.29 30.41 47.56
59 0.99 0.44 116.36 121.62 3.42 3.15 37.17 34.29 38.02 59.45
60 0.99 0.46 119.78 125.20 3.42 3.15 37.17 34.29 40.71 66.81
61 1.00 0.48 118.29 122.83 -1.49 -1.37 -18.15 -16.73 42.96 73.77
62 1.01 0.50 116.36 119.95 -1.92 -1.77 -20.90 -19.28 44.81 80.35
63 1.02 0.52 114.03 116.59 -2.34 -2.15 -25.39 -23.42 41.81 82.47
64 1.02 0.52 106.84 108.27 -7.18 -6.62 -78.00 -71.95 39.02 84.79
65 1.02 0.52 99.87 100.19 -6.97 -6.42 -75.73 -69.85 36.43 87.29
66 1.02 0.52 93.10 92.34 -6.77 -6.24 -73.52 -67.82 34.04 89.97
67 1.02 0.52 86.53 84.73 -6.57 -6.05 -71.38 -65.84 31.84 92.83
68 1.02 0.52 80.15 77.33 -6.38 -5.88 -69.30 -63.93 29.82 95.85
69 1.02 0.52 73.95 70.16 -6.19 -5.71 -67.28 -62.06 27.99 99.05
70 1.02 0.52 67.94 63.19 -6.01 -5.54 -65.32 -60.26 26.33 102.41
Earnings Domestic
Employed Domestic 11.06
Retired Domestic 15.62
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value  
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Table C14. Incentive calculations, Finland (old system) average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 5 0 . 4 2 1 6 0 . 1 1 1 3 9 . 5 1………… 1 1 . 8 5 1 7 . 6 7
56 0.96 0.43 165.45 144.16 5.34 5.52 41.65 43.06 23.69 35.34
57 0.97 0.45 170.79 148.81 5.34 5.52 41.65 43.06 35.54 53.01
58 0.98 0.46 176.12 153.46 5.34 5.52 41.65 43.06 47.39 70.68
59 0.98 0.47 181.46 158.11 5.34 5.52 41.65 43.06 59.24 88.35
60 0.99 0.49 186.80 162.76 5.34 5.52 41.65 43.06 63.42 98.10
61 1.00 0.51 184.48 159.92 -2.32 -2.40 -18.13 -18.75 66.93 107.15
62 1.02 0.53 181.47 156.43 -3.00 -3.10 -23.43 -24.22 69.80 115.53
63 1.03 0.56 177.83 152.34 -3.65 -3.77 -28.45 -29.42 65.11 116.10
64 1.03 0.56 166.63 141.77 -11.20 -11.58 -87.41 -90.36 60.74 117.01
65 1.03 0.56 155.75 131.50 -10.87 -11.24 -84.87 -87.73 56.70 118.25
66 1.03 0.56 145.20 121.54 -10.56 -10.91 -82.39 -85.18 52.96 119.80
67 1.03 0.56 134.95 111.86 -10.25 -10.60 -79.99 -82.69 49.52 121.66
68 1.03 0.56 125.00 102.46 -9.95 -10.29 -77.66 -80.29 46.37 123.83
69 1.03 0.56 115.34 93.34 -9.66 -9.99 -75.40 -77.95 43.50 126.28
70 1.03 0.56 105.96 84.49 -9.38 -9.70 -73.21 -75.68 40.90 129.02
Earnings Domestic
Employed 12.15 9.28
Retired 5.29 14.92
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C15. Incentive calculations, Germany average earnings men, healthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 7 0 0 . 5 2 1 8 4 . 7 3 1 4 0 . 1 7………… 2 4 . 7 2 3 1 . 9 7
56 0.76 0.62 196.21 158.29 11.48 18.13 117.56 191.85 42.17 51.72
57 0.77 0.64 200.43 164.20 4.22 5.91 26.77 39.44 59.79 71.69
58 0.79 0.66 204.81 170.34 4.38 6.13 27.77 40.91 77.57 91.90
59 0.81 0.69 209.35 176.70 4.54 6.36 28.81 42.44 95.51 112.34
60 0.82 0.71 214.06 183.29 4.71 6.60 29.88 44.03 113.64 133.02
61 0.84 0.74 218.95 190.14 4.89 6.85 31.00 45.67 131.94 153.96
62 0.86 0.77 224.02 197.24 5.07 7.10 32.16 47.38 150.44 175.17
63 0.88 0.80 229.28 204.61 5.26 7.37 33.36 49.15 148.95 178.41
64 0.90 0.82 214.56 194.00 -14.72 -10.60 -96.49 -70.73 147.30 181.13
65 0.92 0.86 199.67 182.88 -14.89 -11.13 -97.46 -74.24 148.13 187.03
66 0.96 0.91 187.27 174.94 -12.41 -7.93 -81.63 -52.94 148.43 191.91
67 0.99 0.96 174.32 165.98 -12.94 -8.96 -84.95 -59.79 148.12 195.69
68 1.03 1.02 160.78 155.92 -13.54 -10.07 -88.66 -67.16 147.16 198.28
69 1.07 1.08 146.58 144.66 -14.20 -11.25 -92.78 -75.08 145.46 199.59
70 1.12 1.15 131.65 132.13 -14.93 -12.53 -97.34 -83.59 142.96 199.53
Earnings Domestic
Employed 18.07 4.58
Retired 9.25 5.08
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual  
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Table C16. Incentive calculations, Germany average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 7 8 0 . 5 2 2 0 5 . 4 5 1 4 0 . 1 7………… 2 3 . 7 1 3 1 . 9 7
56 0.85 0.62 217.64 158.29 12.18 18.13 125.25 191.85 39.65 51.72
57 0.86 0.64 222.05 164.20 4.42 5.91 28.18 39.44 55.75 71.69
58 0.88 0.66 226.63 170.34 4.58 6.13 29.23 40.91 72.03 91.90
59 0.90 0.69 231.39 176.70 4.75 6.36 30.32 42.44 88.49 112.34
60 0.92 0.71 236.32 183.29 4.93 6.60 31.45 44.03 105.13 133.02
61 0.93 0.74 241.43 190.14 5.11 6.85 32.63 45.67 121.96 153.96
62 0.95 0.77 246.74 197.24 5.31 7.10 33.84 47.38 138.98 175.17
63 0.97 0.80 252.24 204.61 5.50 7.37 35.11 49.15 134.05 178.41
64 1.00 0.82 235.78 194.00 -16.46 -10.60 -108.76 -70.73 128.97 181.13
65 1.02 0.86 219.18 182.88 -16.61 -11.13 -109.58 -74.24 126.51 187.03
66 1.06 0.91 205.20 174.94 -13.98 -7.93 -92.71 -52.94 123.53 191.91
67 1.09 0.96 190.69 165.98 -14.51 -8.96 -96.01 -59.79 119.94 195.69
68 1.14 1.02 175.58 155.92 -15.11 -10.07 -99.72 -67.16 115.69 198.28
69 1.18 1.08 159.81 144.66 -15.77 -11.25 -103.87 -75.08 110.70 199.59
70 1.23 1.15 143.29 132.13 -16.51 -12.53 -108.49 -83.59 104.90 199.53
Earnings Domestic
Employed 18.07 3.84
Retired 9.25 5.78
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
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Table C17. Incentive calculations, Germany average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 5 0 . 5 6 1 0 0 . 6 8 1 1 1 . 1 8………… 2 2 . 6 0 2 6 . 8 4
56 1.02 0.66 116.09 126.98 15.41 15.81 186.32 190.15 34.12 42.61
57 1.03 0.69 120.43 131.72 4.34 4.74 42.41 46.39 45.80 58.56
58 1.05 0.72 124.92 136.64 4.50 4.92 44.00 48.13 57.64 74.70
59 1.07 0.74 129.59 141.75 4.67 5.10 45.64 49.92 69.67 91.02
60 1.09 0.77 134.43 147.04 4.84 5.29 47.34 51.79 81.87 107.55
61 1.11 0.80 139.45 152.53 5.02 5.49 49.11 53.72 94.26 124.27
62 1.13 0.83 144.66 158.23 5.21 5.70 50.95 55.73 106.84 141.22
63 1.15 0.86 150.06 164.14 5.40 5.91 52.85 57.81 109.08 146.84
64 1.17 0.89 145.11 158.72 -4.95 -5.41 -48.40 -52.94 111.06 152.17
65 1.20 0.92 139.91 153.03 -5.21 -5.70 -50.94 -55.72 115.70 160.42
66 1.23 0.98 137.36 150.25 -2.54 -2.78 -24.86 -27.20 119.87 168.16
67 1.28 1.04 134.35 146.95 -3.01 -3.29 -29.47 -32.24 123.53 175.34
68 1.32 1.10 130.83 143.10 -3.52 -3.85 -34.44 -37.68 126.64 181.92
69 1.36 1.17 126.76 138.65 -4.07 -4.45 -39.81 -43.55 129.17 187.86
70 1.41 1.24 122.10 133.55 -4.66 -5.10 -45.60 -49.88 131.05 193.09
Earnings Domestic
Employed 11.03 4.47
Retired 6.16 8.32
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value  
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Table C18. Incentive calculations, the Netherlands average earnings men, healthy 
  
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 8 9 0 . 4 4 2 6 6 . 9 7 1 5 1 . 5 7………… 1 0 . 9 2 1 6 . 0 4
56 0 . 9 0 0 . 4 4 2 6 9 . 9 2 1 5 5 . 0 2………… 1 9 . 8 7 2 9 . 7 6
57 0 . 9 0 0 . 4 5 2 7 0 . 8 7 1 5 6 . 1 4………… 2 9 . 2 5 4 3 . 9 9
58 0 . 9 0 0 . 4 5 2 7 2 . 2 7 1 5 7 . 7 8………… 3 8 . 6 2 5 8 . 2 2
59 0 . 9 1 0 . 4 5 2 7 3 . 6 6 1 5 9 . 4 1………… 4 8 . 0 0 7 2 . 4 5
60 0 . 9 1 0 . 4 6 2 7 5 . 0 6 1 6 1 . 0 4………… 3 7 . 8 6 7 5 . 2 0
61 0.91 0.46 256.94 151.19 -18.12 -9.85 -46.61 -17.53 28.10 78.05
62 0.91 0.46 239.19 141.45 -17.75 -9.74 -45.25 -17.02 18.70 81.01
63 0.92 0.46 221.81 131.81 -17.38 -9.64 -43.93 -16.52 9.67 84.08
64 0.92 0.47 204.79 122.29 -17.02 -9.53 -42.65 -16.04 0.98 87.26
65 0.92 0.47 188.12 112.87 -16.67 -9.42 -41.41 -15.57 -8.21 89.55
66 0.92 0.47 170.95 102.56 -17.17 -10.30 -40.21 -15.12 -16.90 92.14
67 0.92 0.47 154.27 92.56 -16.67 -10.00 -39.03 -14.68 -25.11 95.03
68 0.92 0.47 138.08 82.85 -16.19 -9.71 -37.90 -14.25 -32.84 98.19
69 0.92 0.47 122.37 73.42 -15.72 -9.43 -36.79 -13.84 -40.12 101.64
70 0.92 0.47 107.11 64.26 -15.26 -9.15 -35.72 -13.43 -46.95 105.34
Earnings Domestic
Employed 12.60 3.44
Retired 6.24 8.05
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
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Table C19. Incentive calculations, the Netherlands average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 8 0 0 . 4 4 2 6 6 . 8 5 1 6 2 . 4 1………… 1 2 . 4 5 1 6 . 0 4
56 0 . 8 0 0 . 4 4 2 6 9 . 6 4 1 6 5 . 8 6………… 2 3 . 0 2 2 9 . 7 6
57 0 . 8 0 0 . 4 5 2 7 0 . 5 5 1 6 6 . 9 8………… 3 4 . 0 0 4 3 . 9 9
58 0 . 8 1 0 . 4 5 2 7 1 . 8 8 1 6 8 . 6 2………… 4 4 . 9 8 5 8 . 2 2
59 0 . 8 1 0 . 4 5 2 7 3 . 2 0 1 7 0 . 2 5………… 5 5 . 9 7 7 2 . 4 5
60 0 . 8 1 0 . 4 6 2 7 4 . 5 2 1 7 1 . 8 8………… 4 7 . 4 8 7 4 . 4 3
61 0.81 0.46 256.37 161.27 -18.15 -10.62 -86.35 -51.14 39.37 76.54
62 0.82 0.46 238.61 150.78 -17.77 -10.49 -84.56 -50.55 31.64 78.78
63 0.82 0.46 221.21 140.43 -17.39 -10.36 -82.81 -49.95 24.27 81.15
64 0.82 0.47 204.19 130.20 -17.03 -10.23 -81.09 -49.36 17.27 83.65
65 0.82 0.47 187.52 120.10 -16.67 -10.10 -79.42 -48.77 9.81 85.28
66 0.82 0.47 170.40 109.13 -17.12 -10.96 -81.78 -53.12 2.85 87.23
67 0.82 0.47 153.78 98.49 -16.62 -10.64 -79.40 -51.58 -3.63 89.49
68 0.82 0.47 137.65 88.15 -16.14 -10.33 -77.08 -50.07 -9.64 92.06
69 0.82 0.47 121.98 78.12 -15.67 -10.03 -74.84 -48.62 -15.19 94.91
70 0.82 0.47 106.77 68.38 -15.21 -9.74 -72.66 -47.20 -20.29 98.05
Earnings Domestic
Employed 12.60 4.72
Retired 6.24 7.66
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%)  
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Table C20. Incentive calculations, the Netherlands average earnings women, healthy 
   
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 0 7 . 0 9 7 2 . 9 7………… 7 . 4 3 8 . 3 9
56 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 0 9 . 5 0 7 2 . 9 7………… 1 3 . 2 4 1 6 . 7 8
57 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 1 0 . 2 8 7 2 . 9 7………… 1 9 . 4 1 2 5 . 1 8
58 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 1 1 . 4 2 7 2 . 9 7………… 2 5 . 5 8 3 3 . 5 7
59 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 1 2 . 5 6 7 2 . 9 7………… 3 1 . 7 4 4 1 . 9 6
60 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 9 1 1 3 . 7 0 7 2 . 9 7………… 3 1 . 1 3 4 6 . 0 4
61 0.90 0.39 108.06 68.66 -5.64 -4.31 -59.85 -54.55 30.58 50.25
62 0.90 0.39 102.49 64.48 -5.58 -4.18 -58.91 -52.96 30.10 54.58
63 0.90 0.39 96.97 60.42 -5.51 -4.06 -57.98 -51.42 29.68 59.03
64 0.90 0.39 91.53 56.48 -5.45 -3.94 -57.07 -49.92 29.32 63.60
65 0.90 0.39 86.15 52.65 -5.38 -3.83 -56.16 -48.47 28.27 68.27
66 0.90 0.39 80.07 48.93 -6.08 -3.72 -61.45 -47.06 27.39 73.06
67 0.90 0.39 74.16 45.32 -5.90 -3.61 -59.66 -45.69 26.69 77.95
68 0.90 0.39 68.43 41.82 -5.73 -3.50 -57.93 -44.36 26.15 82.94
69 0.90 0.39 62.86 38.42 -5.57 -3.40 -56.24 -43.06 25.77 88.03
70 0.90 0.39 57.46 35.12 -5.40 -3.30 -54.60 -41.81 25.55 93.21
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.39 7.76
Retired 2.99 11.12
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C21. Incentive calculations, the Netherlands average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 7 3 0 . 3 7 1 2 5 . 6 8 8 7 . 7 0………… 1 0 . 8 9 1 1 . 7 0
56 0 . 7 4 0 . 3 8 1 2 8 . 3 2 9 0 . 7 3………… 1 9 . 6 3 1 9 . 9 8
57 0 . 7 4 0 . 3 8 1 2 9 . 1 8 9 0 . 7 3………… 2 8 . 9 4 2 8 . 4 5
58 0 . 7 4 0 . 3 8 1 3 0 . 4 2 9 0 . 7 3………… 3 8 . 2 6 3 6 . 9 2
59 0 . 7 4 0 . 3 8 1 3 1 . 6 7 9 0 . 7 3………… 4 7 . 5 7 4 5 . 3 9
60 0 . 7 4 0 . 3 8 1 3 2 . 9 2 9 0 . 7 3………… 4 8 . 9 6 4 8 . 5 1
61 0.74 0.38 126.25 85.37 -6.67 -5.36 -70.91 -65.81 50.44 51.78
62 0.74 0.38 119.66 80.17 -6.59 -5.20 -69.74 -63.89 52.01 55.20
63 0.74 0.38 113.16 75.12 -6.50 -5.05 -68.58 -62.03 53.66 58.77
64 0.74 0.38 106.74 70.22 -6.42 -4.90 -67.44 -60.22 55.39 62.48
65 0.74 0.38 100.40 65.46 -6.33 -4.76 -66.32 -58.47 56.37 66.33
66 0.74 0.38 93.32 60.84 -7.09 -4.62 -72.09 -56.77 57.55 70.32
67 0.74 0.38 86.44 56.35 -6.88 -4.49 -69.99 -55.11 58.94 74.43
68 0.74 0.38 79.75 52.00 -6.68 -4.36 -67.95 -53.51 60.52 78.68
69 0.74 0.38 73.27 47.77 -6.49 -4.23 -65.97 -51.95 62.29 83.04
70 0.74 0.38 66.97 43.66 -6.30 -4.11 -64.05 -50.44 64.24 87.53
Earnings Domestic
Employed 8.66 9.85
Retired 2.99 10.25
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value  
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Table C22. Incentive calculations, Portugal average earnings men, all 
 
 
Last year 
of work ension Wealth
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 9 7 0 . 7 9 4 5 . 3 9 3 5 . 9 9………… 5 . 0 4 5 . 9 2
56 0.99 0.82 47.91 37.19 1.64 1.84 39.75 44.71 10.08 11.83
57 1.01 0.84 50.43 38.39 1.64 1.84 39.75 44.71 15.12 17.75
58 1.04 0.87 52.95 39.59 1.64 1.84 39.75 44.71 20.16 23.67
59 1.06 0.89 55.47 40.79 1.64 1.84 39.75 44.71 25.20 29.59
60 1.08 0.92 56.89 41.99 1.64 1.84 39.75 44.71 24.73 30.76
61 1.11 0.95 54.74 40.14 -3.87 -2.91 -94.80 -70.56 24.19 31.81
62 1.13 0.97 52.51 38.21 -3.94 -3.03 -96.49 -73.51 23.58 32.74
63 1.15 1.00 50.21 36.21 -4.00 -3.14 -98.05 -76.29 22.91 33.57
64 1.18 1.03 47.86 34.14 -4.07 -3.25 -99.49 -78.89 22.19 34.29
65 1.20 1.05 45.19 32.01 -4.12 -3.35 -100.81 -81.34 20.43 33.82
66 1.20 1.05 41.86 29.09 -5.16 -4.55 -125.89 -110.47 18.81 33.48
67 1.20 1.05 38.67 26.25 -5.01 -4.42 -122.22 -107.26 17.35 33.27
68 1.20 1.05 35.60 23.50 -4.86 -4.29 -118.66 -104.13 16.03 33.19
69 1.20 1.05 32.64 20.82 -4.72 -4.16 -115.21 -101.10 14.84 33.22
70 1.20 1.05 29.81 18.23 -4.58 -4.04 -74.80 -65.26 13.79 33.38
Earnings Domestic
Employed 4.08 0.50
Retired 3.23 1.18
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C23. Incentive calculations, Portugal average earnings women, all 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 1 . 0 3 0 . 7 7 5 1 . 7 7 5 3 . 3 3………… 3 . 8 4 5 . 0 0
56 1.04 0.80 53.50 55.10 1.73 1.78 54.56 58.17 7.67 10.00
57 1.06 0.83 55.22 56.88 1.73 1.78 54.56 58.17 11.51 15.01
58 1.08 0.85 56.95 58.66 1.73 1.78 54.56 58.17 15.35 20.01
59 1.10 0.88 58.68 60.44 1.73 1.78 54.56 58.17 19.18 25.01
60 1.12 0.90 60.40 62.21 1.73 1.78 54.56 58.17 19.24 26.11
61 1.14 0.93 58.34 60.09 -2.06 -2.12 -65.09 -69.41 19.19 27.12
62 1.15 0.95 56.19 57.87 -2.16 -2.22 -68.16 -72.68 19.06 28.03
63 1.17 0.98 53.94 55.56 -2.25 -2.31 -71.04 -75.75 18.83 28.85
64 1.19 1.01 51.61 53.16 -2.33 -2.40 -73.75 -78.64 18.53 29.59
65 1.21 1.03 49.19 50.67 -2.41 -2.49 -76.29 -81.35 17.02 29.07
66 1.21 1.03 45.57 46.93 -3.63 -3.74 -114.68 -122.28 15.61 28.67
67 1.21 1.03 42.04 43.31 -3.52 -3.63 -111.34 -118.72 14.30 28.37
68 1.21 1.03 38.63 39.78 -3.42 -3.52 -108.10 -115.26 13.09 28.18
69 1.21 1.03 35.31 36.36 -3.32 -3.42 -104.95 -111.91 11.98 28.08
70 1.21 1.03 32.08 33.05 -3.22 -3.32 -101.89 -108.65 10.96 28.08
Earnings Domestic
Employed 3.22 2.18
Retired 3.23 1.18
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%)  
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Table C24. Incentive calculations, the United Kingdom average earnings men, healthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 6 0 0 . 2 3 2 0 6 . 3 4 8 6 . 4 8………… 1 6 . 7 5 1 9 . 1 9
56 0.60 0.23 208.18 88.69 1.83 2.22 7.87 9.62 33.51 38.37
57 0.61 0.24 210.01 90.91 1.83 2.22 7.87 9.62 50.26 57.56
58 0.61 0.25 211.84 93.13 1.83 2.22 7.87 9.62 67.01 76.74
59 0.61 0.25 213.68 95.34 1.83 2.22 7.87 9.62 83.76 95.93
60 0.62 0.26 215.51 97.56 1.83 2.22 7.87 9.62 85.18 106.59
61 0.62 0.26 202.00 92.74 -13.51 -4.83 -61.20 -20.93 86.78 117.14
62 0.63 0.27 188.68 87.81 -13.32 -4.93 -60.29 -21.38 88.57 127.60
63 0.63 0.27 175.56 82.78 -13.13 -5.03 -59.38 -21.80 90.55 137.98
64 0.64 0.28 162.62 77.67 -12.94 -5.11 -58.49 -22.18 160.11 232.08
65 0.95 0.68 217.26 156.29 54.64 78.62 254.40 368.82 156.31 234.64
66 0.96 0.68 198.53 143.36 -18.72 -12.92 -85.21 -58.59 152.86 237.36
67 0.96 0.69 180.17 130.59 -18.36 -12.77 -83.52 -57.85 149.78 240.23
68 0.97 0.70 162.16 117.98 -18.01 -12.62 -81.87 -57.12 147.03 243.25
69 0.97 0.70 144.50 105.51 -17.66 -12.47 -80.25 -56.39 144.63 246.42
70 0.98 0.71 127.18 93.20 -17.32 -12.31 -78.66 -55.67 142.56 249.74
Earnings Domestic
Employed 22.20 4.45
Retired 5.17 9.26
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
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Table C25. Incentive calculations, the United Kingdom average earnings men, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 5 0 0 . 2 3 1 7 3 . 5 7 8 6 . 4 8………… 1 9 . 4 7 1 9 . 5 4
56 0.50 0.23 175.33 88.69 1.76 2.22 7.55 9.62 38.94 39.08
57 0.50 0.24 177.09 90.91 1.76 2.22 7.55 9.62 58.41 58.62
58 0.51 0.25 178.85 93.13 1.76 2.22 7.55 9.62 77.88 78.16
59 0.51 0.25 180.62 95.34 1.76 2.22 7.55 9.62 97.35 97.69
60 0.52 0.26 182.38 97.56 1.76 2.22 7.55 9.62 103.83 108.35
61 0.52 0.26 171.14 92.74 -11.24 -4.83 -50.65 -20.93 110.43 118.91
62 0.53 0.27 160.04 87.81 -11.10 -4.93 -50.00 -21.38 117.17 129.37
63 0.53 0.27 149.07 82.78 -10.97 -5.03 -49.36 -21.80 124.04 139.74
64 0.54 0.28 138.23 77.67 -10.84 -5.11 -48.72 -22.18 195.49 233.85
65 0.83 0.68 191.97 156.29 53.74 78.62 249.76 368.82 196.74 236.41
66 0.84 0.68 175.51 143.36 -16.46 -12.92 -74.66 -58.59 198.29 239.13
67 0.84 0.69 159.36 130.59 -16.15 -12.77 -73.24 -57.85 200.14 241.99
68 0.85 0.70 143.50 117.98 -15.86 -12.62 -71.85 -57.12 202.28 245.01
69 0.85 0.70 127.93 105.51 -15.57 -12.47 -70.49 -56.39 204.71 248.19
70 0.86 0.71 112.65 93.20 -15.28 -12.31 -69.16 -55.67 207.42 251.51
Earnings Domestic
Employed 22.20 5.51
Retired 5.17 7.53
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%)  
 
8
8
 
|
 
P
I
E
K
K
O
L
A
 
A
N
D
 
L
E
I
J
O
L
A
 
Table C26. Incentive calculations, the United Kingdom average earnings women, healthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 6 2 0 . 2 1 1 7 8 . 3 8 6 3 . 2 6………… 1 4 . 2 4 1 7 . 3 4
56 0.63 0.22 179.56 64.89 1.18 1.62 6.42 9.24 28.48 34.69
57 0.63 0.22 180.74 66.51 1.18 1.62 6.42 9.24 42.72 52.03
58 0.63 0.23 181.92 68.13 1.18 1.62 6.42 9.24 56.96 69.38
59 0.64 0.23 183.10 69.75 1.18 1.62 6.42 9.24 71.20 86.72
60 0.64 0.24 184.28 71.37 1.18 1.62 6.42 9.24 152.67 213.68
61 0.95 0.63 252.71 185.06 68.42 113.68 445.56 793.97 150.23 216.15
62 0.96 0.64 237.20 174.26 -15.50 -10.80 -100.73 -71.32 148.12 218.79
63 0.96 0.64 222.04 163.62 -15.16 -10.64 -98.39 -70.12 146.36 221.59
64 0.96 0.65 207.22 153.14 -14.82 -10.48 -96.11 -68.94 144.92 224.55
65 0.97 0.73 192.72 142.82 -14.50 -10.32 -93.89 -67.77 143.80 227.66
66 0.97 0.74 178.54 132.65 -14.18 -10.16 -91.72 -66.63 142.99 230.92
67 0.97 0.74 164.68 122.64 -13.86 -10.01 -89.60 -65.50 142.49 234.34
68 0.98 0.75 151.12 112.79 -13.56 -9.86 -87.54 -64.40 142.29 237.91
69 0.98 0.75 137.86 103.08 -13.26 -9.71 -85.52 -63.31 142.37 241.63
70 0.98 0.76 … 93.52 -12.97 -9.56 -83.56 -62.24 142.75 245.49
Earnings Domestic
Employed 16.61 7.34
Retired 3.52 10.89
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Option Value Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) 
 
A
G
E
I
N
G
,
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
A
N
D
 
R
E
T
I
R
E
M
E
N
T
 
I
N
 
E
U
R
O
P
E
 
–
 
A
G
I
R
 
|
 
8
9
Table C27. Incentive calculations, the United Kingdom average earnings women, unhealthy 
 
Last year 
of work
Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total Partial
55 0 . 5 0 0 . 2 5 2 1 7 . 2 9 1 1 5 . 2 0………… 2 3 . 5 3 2 3 . 5 8
56 0.51 0.25 219.69 118.15 2.40 2.95 9.61 12.32 47.05 47.15
57 0.51 0.26 222.09 121.11 2.40 2.95 9.61 12.32 70.58 70.73
58 0.52 0.27 224.49 124.06 2.40 2.95 9.61 12.32 94.11 94.31
59 0.52 0.27 226.88 127.01 2.40 2.95 9.61 12.32 117.64 117.89
60 0.53 0.28 229.28 129.97 2.40 2.95 9.61 12.32 222.94 255.98
61 0.79 0.56 313.45 249.54 84.17 119.57 398.25 599.06 225.67 260.62
62 0.79 0.57 295.05 235.66 -18.40 -13.88 -85.55 -64.72 228.71 265.38
63 0.80 0.57 276.97 221.90 -18.08 -13.76 -83.96 -64.00 232.07 270.27
64 0.80 0.58 259.20 208.27 -17.77 -13.63 -82.40 -63.29 235.73 275.29
65 0.81 0.67 241.73 194.76 -17.47 -13.50 -80.87 -62.57 239.70 280.44
66 0.81 0.67 224.56 181.39 -17.17 -13.37 -79.36 -61.86 243.95 285.72
67 0.82 0.68 207.69 168.15 -16.87 -13.24 -77.89 -61.14 248.50 291.13
68 0.82 0.69 191.11 155.04 -16.58 -13.11 -76.44 -60.43 253.34 296.68
69 0.83 0.69 174.81 142.07 -16.29 -12.98 -75.02 -59.72 258.46 302.36
70 0.83 0.70 … 129.22 -16.01 -12.84 -73.63 -59.01 263.85 308.17
Earnings Domestic
Employed 23.17 6.31
Retired 5.97 8.35
Tax/Subsidy (%) is pension wealth accrual as percentage of after-tax wage earnings.
Earnings = Net wages (employed), net pension (retired) in thousand euros. Domestic=Value of domestic work
Replacement Rate Pension Wealth Accrual Tax/Subsidy  (%) Option Value 
| 90 
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Appendix D. Pension Rules and Tax Treatments 
in 2000 
Belgium 
The accrual rate is 2.7% and the maximum pension is rate is 60%. The pension rate 
is 75% in the public sector and 60% for wage earners and the self-employed, unless 
it concerns a married person with a dependent spouse who does not receive any 
income or benefits (then also 75%). The minimum pension is €741.15 for single 
people, €926.13 for married people. These are minimum pensions for a full career. 
Pensionable age is 60 years. 
Men may retire at the age of 60 if replaced by unemployed persons. Women may 
retire if unemployed or disabled between the age of 61 and 65. People can retire as 
of the age of 60 with 26-year career for retirement in 2000 (22-year career in 1998, 
24-year career in 1999, 30-year career in 2002, 32-year career in 2003, 34-year 
career in 2004, 35-year career in 2005).  
Social security contributions are paid based on the total amount of the pension, but 
are not the same as for employed people. Wage earners pay 3.55% social security 
contributions for sickness and invalidity, provided that (in 2001) this contribution 
does not mean that the pension paid to single people is less than €1116,73 or 
€1395,91 for married people. On top of that, another contribution ranging between 
0.5 and 2% is paid for pension financing, according to the pension level and only for 
people receiving pensions higher than €1974,6 (single) or €2256,68 (married). This 
is called the 'solidarity contribution'. Civil servants pay the same contributions + 
0.5% to finance funeral benefits.  
Self-employed people do not pay contributions from their pensions. Their pensions 
are financed by the contributions paid during their career and an annual federal 
amount. As for taxes, the normal tax rates apply to pensions, as can be found in 
Table 5. Since pensions are replacement income, a reduction is allowed of €1478,76 
(per year) for single people and €1726,65 (per year) for families. Wage-earner and 
self-employed pensions follow the evolution of the consumer price index, that is, the 
health consumer price index, corrected for cigarettes, etc. These pensions are also 
irregularly adapted to the living standards. 
Tax treatment of wage income 
1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
•  Social security payments deductible  
•  A deduction for work-related expenses from taxable income net of 
social security payments according to the following schedule: AGEING, HEALTH AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE – AGIR | 91 
 
 
Gross wage less soc sec. payments (BEF)  % 
< 168 000  20 
168 000 – 337 000  10 
337 000 – 561 000  5 
> 561 000  3 
•  210 000 BEF tax credit for single taxpayers 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
Taxable income (BEF)  Marginal tax rate (%) 
< 258 000  25 
258 000 – 342 000  30 
342 000 – 488 000  40 
488 000 – 1 123 000  45 
1 123 000 – 1 684 000  50 
1 684 000 – 2 470 000  52.5 
> 2 470 000  55 
 
2.  Local income tax 
•  Local income tax rates set by municipalities, average rate 7% of gross 
income 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  Average employer social security contribution 34.7% of the gross 
wage 
3.2  Employee 
•  Pension insurance: 7.5% of the gross wage 
•  Unemployment insurance: 0.87% of the gross wage. 
•  Sickness insurance: 3.55% of the gross wage 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 23%.  
Denmark 
The basic old age pension is DKK 4002 a month (48024 a year), supplementary 3968 
a month (47616 a year). Universal partial early retirement pension is assumed to be 
the maximum 79 464 a year. The basic pension is reduced if the conditions for 
obtaining a full pension (40 years of residence) are not fulfilled. In this last case: 
1/40 of full pension for each year of residence between the ages of 15 and 67 (65). 92 | PIEKKOLA AND LEIJOLA 
 
The special pension scheme (SP): maximum monthly benefits paid for 10 years. 
From the age of 65 a person may be eligible for the old-age pension, which consists 
of a basic amount and a pension supplement. The supplementary pension is 3968 a 
month (47616 a year), for single pensioners and DKK 21,468 a year for others. The 
supplementary pension (ATP-pension), if the insured has been affiliated to the 
supplementary scheme since 1 April 1964 and has always worked full-time since 
then, is a max 18,000 otherwise ignored (see 
europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social). 
Tax treatment of wage income 
1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Tax credits 
•  For central government income tax DKK 2 338 5 
•  For local government income tax and church tax DKK 10 955 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
Bracket  Threshold (DKK)  Rate (%) 
Low   7 
Medium 164  300  6 
High 267  600  15 
 
2.  Local income tax 
2.1  Local income tax rates 
•  Municipality tax 21.7%, County tax 11%, Church tax 1% 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  DKK 1789 for the Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme 
3.2  Employee 
•  Social security contributions 8% of the gross wage added with 1% of 
the gross wage towards the Labour Market Supplementary Pension 
Scheme 
•  DKK 849 for the Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme 
•  DKK 6 840 for unemployment insurance 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 25%. 
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Finland 
Old system: 
Pension accrual 1.5% and 60-64 2.5%, early retirement pension 60-64 reduced by 
5.64-6% depending on the birth year. Government pension 2547 a month, 2272 for a 
married person, depending on the municipality of residence. Reduced by one-half of 
the amount exceeding 245 a month of the pension based on employment contracts. 
Not paid if earnings-related pension exceeds 5090-5311 a month, depending on 
municipality. A married person: no pension if his earnings-related pension exceeds 
4484-4672 a month (1998 figures). Pension income is taxable. Additional sickness 
insurance for pensioners is 2.7 (in addition to 1.5).  
New system: 
Pension accrual starts at age 18 based on the whole working career, accrual is 1.5% 
before 53, 1.9% at the age of 53-62 and 4.5% in age 63-68. The new system is partly 
financed by an increase in the social security payment of employees by 30% from 
age 54 onwards. Pension is reduced by 7.2 at age 62 if retirement takes place at age 
62 and not at age 63. However, entitlement to unemployment benefits and from there 
to pension at 62 years keeps the pensionable age at 60 years as before. Pension 
income is taxable. Additional sickness insurance for pensioners is 2.7 (in addition to 
1.5). 
1)  If unemployed at 60 years one can have pensions without deductions; the accrual 
rate stays positive at 1.9% a year. Assumed that unemployment benefits are 60% 
of earnings 
2)  An unemployed person at the age of 63 is entitled to a full pension. If he or she 
retires a year earlier, the pension is deducted by 7.2%.  
Tax treatment of wage income 
1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
•  Work-related expenses: deduction equal to 3% of wages up to a 
maximum of FIM 2 4006 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
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Taxable income 
(FIM) 
Tax on lower limit 
(FIM) 
Tax on wage exceeding 
the upper limit (%) 
47 600 – 63 600  50  5 
63 600 – 81 000  850  15 
81 000 – 113 000  3 460  19 
113 000 – 178 000  9 540  25 
178 000 – 315 000  25 790  31 
315 000 –   68 260  37.5 
 
2.  Local income tax 
2.1  Allowances  
•  Deduction from wage: 20% of income exceeding FIM 15 000 up to a 
maximum of FIM 9 800. The allowance is reduced by 3.5% for 
income exceeding FIM 75 000. Basic deduction: FIM 8 800 
2.2  Local income tax rate 
•  Average municipal income tax rate 17.67% of the gross wage. 
Church tax 1.3% of the gross wage 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  Average employer social security contribution 26% of the gross 
wage 
3.2   Employee 
•  Pension insurance: 4.7% of the gross wage. At age 54, increased by 
30%. Unemployment insurance: 1% of the gross wage. At age 54, 
increased by 30%. Pension and unemployment insurance payments 
are deductible for income tax purposes 
•  Sickness insurance: 1.5% of the gross wage 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 22%. 
Germany 
Entitlement to the old-age pension is at 63 with 35 years of contribution, at 65 with 5 
years. Retirement age has been 60 for women, but is being gradually shifted to 65 
(assumed for both genders). The maximum of pensions is 75% of average earnings 
of all insured. Old-age pension benefits=earnings points*pension factor*pension 
value. Earnings points= annual earnings divided by the average earnings of all 
contributors. Pension factor=1 (increases if retirement postponed). Pension value= 
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retirement after age 65, an added factor of 1.0 plus .005 for each month is used to 
increase the benefit (pension factor). Pension for low income earners: for people 
with 35 years of insurance, earning points are adjusted, if need be, up to 1.5 times 
the average value, up to a maximum of 75% of average earnings of all insured 
(social security around the world). Average gr. earnings of all contributors in 1999: 
€53508 (1.95583*27358). The average net earnings of all contributors in 1999 was 
€33,517 (1.95583*17137) and in 2000 it was €34,143. Contributions levied on 
earnings between a floor of 1% and a ceiling of 170% of average earnings, about 
272.58 DEM and 46338.6 DEM in 1999. Benefits adjusted annually for changes in 
the real value of pensions compared with changes in earnings. Reference earnings: 
Insured employment income (up to contribution ceiling) during the entire duration of 
the insurance period. The monthly contribution ceiling for 2000 is: West: DEM 
8,600 (€4,397) East: DEM 7,100 (€3,630) (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc2000/d_part6_en.htm) 
Occupational pension income eligible for work-related expenses is 40% of benefits 
not taxable up to ceilings (DEM 6000 for occupational plans). Without any special 
reliefs, DEM 13000 was exempt from tax in 1999 (corrected for 2000). At age 62, 
27% of the pension is taxable, 38% at 55, 32% at 60, 21% at 70, with an additional 
deduction of DEM 200. 
Tax treatment of wage income 
1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
•  Allowance of 6000 DEM for single taxpayers 
•  Deduction for work-related expenses 2000 DEM 
•  Social security payments exceeding (DEM 6000 – 0.16*gross wage) 
up to DEM 2610 deductible. Half of further payments deductible up 
to DEM 1305. The 16% of the gross wage subtracted from the limit 
of DEM 6000 represent the employers’ social security payments. 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
•  Taxable income is rounded down to the next full DEM amount 
divisible by 54 and the income tax liability is calculated by the 
following formulae 
13446 17442
     and      
10000 10000
XX
YZ
−−
==   
where X is the rounded taxable income, and Y and Z determine the 
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X T 
< 13 499  0 
13 500 – 17 495  (262.76Y + 2 290)Y 
17 496 – 114 695  (133.74Z + 2 500)Z + 957 
> 114 696  0.51X – 20 575 
 
2.  Local income tax 
•  There are no local income taxes or deductions in Germany 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  Employer pays the same amount as the employee in pension, 
sickness, unemployment and medical care insurances 
3.2  Employee 
•  Pension insurance: 9.65% of the gross wage or 9.65% of the 
insurable ceiling of DEM 103200, whichever is lower. 
•  Unemployment insurance: 3.25% of the gross wage or 3.25% of the 
insurable ceiling of DEM 103200, whichever is lower. 
•  Sickness insurance: 6.75% of the gross wage or 6.75% of the 
insurable ceiling of DEM 77400, whichever is lower. 
•  Care insurance: 0.85% of the gross wage or 0.85% of the insurable 
ceiling of DEM 77400, whichever is lower. 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 16% 
The Netherlands 
Assumed: at 67% level only public pension 1163 (social security around the world), 
at 100 and 167, 70% of income if 40 yrs at work (OECD Ageing and Income, p.61). 
The additional allowance is NLG 511, which increased to NLG 2152 for incomes 
under NLG 56974 additional deduction for basic pension, NLG 511 or NLG 3057 for 
incomes under 56974 (OECD Taxing Wages, p. 29). The public pension is only for 
those aged 65 or older: APW67 no benefits before 65. 
Tax treatment of wage income 
1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
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•  Deduction for work-related expenses 12% of the gross wage, with a 
minimum of NLG 263 and a maximum of NLG 3538 
•  Unemployment insurance payments deductible 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
Taxable income (NLG)  Tax rate (%) 
< 15 255  4.5 
15 256 – 48 994  8.55 
48 995 – 107 756  50 
> 107 756  60 
 
2.  Local income tax 
•  There are no local income taxes or deductions in the Netherlands 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  Unemployment insurance: 4.8% of the gross wage less the basic 
allowance 
•  Invalidity insurance: 7.7% of the gross wage less the basic allowance 
•  Medical care insurance: 6.35% of the gross wage less the basic 
allowance 
3.2  Employee 
•  Old age pension insurance, widows’ and orphans’ pension insurance, 
and insurance for exceptional medical expenses form the general 
social security scheme. Payments are levied together with income tax 
in the first and second income bracket. Combined, they constitute 
29.4% of taxable income. 
•  Unemployment insurance: 6.25% of the gross wage less the basic 
allowance. No payment if the wage is below 28971. 
•  Health insurance: 1.75% of the gross wage less the basic allowance if 
the wage is below 64 600 plus additional NLG 414 a year per adult. 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 19% 
Portugal 
Old-age pension: Accrual rate 2%, income base is average earnings in the best 10 
yrs. during the last 15 yrs of contribution. Minimum monthly pension 30% of 
average monthly earnings (PTE 307977 a year), maximum 80% of average monthly 
earnings (PTE 820552 a year) (Soc. Sec. World) 
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1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
•  Basic allowance of 70% of the gross income or 72% of the yearly 
minimum wage, whichever is greater 
•  A tax credit of 36720 for each single taxpayer and an additional 
credit according to the income bracket (see income tax rate schedule) 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
Taxable income (PTE)  Marginal tax rate (%)  Additional tax credit 
< 730 000  14   
730 000 – 1 149 000  15  7 300 
1 149 000 – 2 840 000  25  122 200 
2 840 000 – 6 581 000  35  406 200 
> 6 581 000  40  735 250 
 
2.  Local income tax 
•  There are no local income taxes or deductions in Portugal 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  23% of the gross wage 
3.2  Employee 
•  11% of the gross wage 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 17%. 
United Kingdom 
Basic state pension £66.75 a week = £3471 a year for men over 65 and women over 
60, contribution requirements 44 yrs for men and 39 yrs for women. SERPS (State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme) accrual 1.25% of the revalued average earnings 
during contribution years, ceiling £131.22 a week = 6823.44 a year. Original 
replacement target 25% of the average of the best 20 years of earnings, now being 
shifted towards 20% of lifetime average earnings. Contribution requirements 44 
years for women and 49 for men, assumes the individual started working at 16 and 
retires with full pension at 60 (women) and at 65 (men). Here accrual calculated 
based on 20% replacement assuming full contribution and full benefits at retirement 
age. (Gruber and Wise, pp. 415-420) 
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1.  Central government income tax 
1.1  Standard allowances 
•  A personal allowance of GBP 4385 for all taxpayers 
1.2  Income tax rate schedule 
Taxable income  Marginal tax rate (%) 
< 1 520  10 
1 520 – 28 400  22 
> 28 400  40 
 
2.  Local income tax 
•  There are no local income taxes or deductions in the UK 
3.  Social security contributions 
3.1  Employer 
•  12.2% of gross wages exceeding GBP 4368 a year 
3.2  Employee 
•  10% of gross wages between GBP 3952 and GBP 27820 
4.  Consumption tax 
•  Standard value added tax rate 17.5%.  
AGIR – Ageing, Health and Retirement in Europe 
 
AGIR is the title of a major study on the process of population ageing in Europe and its 
future economic consequences. This project was motivated by an interest in verifying 
whether people are not only living longer but also in better health. It aims at analysing 
how the economic impact of population ageing could vary when not only demographic 
factors, but also health developments are taken into consideration. The project started in 
January 2002 for a period of three years.  
The principal objectives of the study are to:  
•  document developments in the health of the elderly, ideally since 1950, based on 
a systematic collection of existing national data on the health and morbidity of 
different cohorts of the population; 
•  analyse retirement decisions and the demand for health care as a function of age, 
health and the utility of work and leisure; 
•  combine these results, and on that basis to elaborate scenarios for the future 
evolution of expenditure on health care and pensions; and 
•  analyse the potential macroeconomic consequences of different measures aiming 
at improving the sustainability of the European pension systems.  
The AGIR project is carried out by a consortium of nine European research institutes, 
most of which are members of ENEPRI: 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), Paris 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  FPB (Belgian Federal Planning Bureau), Brussels 
•  NIESR (National Institute for Economic and Social Research), London 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,  
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
It has received finance from the European Commission, under the Quality of Life 
Programme of the 5
th EU Research Framework Programme. The project is coordinated 
by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. For further information, 
contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. 
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